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THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT IN CONSUMER
PROTECTION: A REMEDIAL PERSPECTIVE
Fabrizio Cafaggi*

INTRODUCTION
EUROPE AND US COMPARED: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

C

onsumer protection and its enforcement have become an important
part of both market design and regulation. Increasing levels of
world trade call for integrated policies with the adoption of framework,
bilateral and trilateral, agreements between the European Community,
the U.S. and Asia, particularly India and China. But how different are
still the regional institutional frameworks? How is the evolution of each
region dependent upon the developments of other areas? Are we
observing a co-evolutionary pattern of growth, or is regulatory
competition the dominant feature of the relationship between different
regional legal systems of consumer protection enforcement?
In order to answer these questions one needs to examine the
important legislative changes occurring both in Europe and in the U.S.1
*

Professor of comparative law at EUI Florence, Visiting professor Global Hauser program

NYU Law School, Fall 2009. This article builds on common research done at EUI with Hans
Micklitz within a project on enforcement of consumer law. Many of these ideas have been
developed discussing the subject in the past two years. I would like to express my gratitude to him.
Valuable research assistance was provided by Valentina Calderai and Federica Casarosa. The
usual disclaimer applies.
Aggregate litigation constitutes an area of relevant transformations. A truly uniform
regime of aggregate litigation does not currently exist in Europe. Academic attempts to design
rules concerning global aggregate litigation have been put forward. While it is possible to have
transborder litigation, Europe-wide collective actions are not yet a reality. The emerging
legislation is national in substance and effects; far away from designing transborder aggregate
litigation when commonality of questions of law and facts exist. In addition, the impact of
aggregate litigation can only concern specific areas within consumer protection because the
solutions vary so significantly within consumer law.
In the U.S., the legal regime for aggregate litigation is quite general, except for some areas,
such as securities, where sector specific legislation has been enacted. Its development within
consumer protection differs substantially in relation to economic losses and personal injuries.
Nationwide class actions in the U.S. have to overcome many procedural obstacles. Moreover, the
differences in substantive law among the fifty states, especially in the area of mass torts, prevent
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Both 'regions' are reshaping their global policies, redefining the
balance between private and public enforcement.2 Changes are made
looking not only inside their legal systems but also at the global level.
Existing differences presumably require complex solutions, integrating
regional and global regulatory frameworks for consumer protection in a
new multilevel system.
The relationship between public and private enforcement has
changed in different ways. Relevant transformations have taken place
in the domain of public enforcement, rethinking the regulatory
strategies concerning consumer enforcement. Private enforcement in
aggregate forms has only recently entered the scene in Europe. Its
evolution has not always been entirely consistent. While it is clear that
aggregate litigation will complement administrative enforcement in
consumer protection, the rationales for its use may differ across sectors.
Does the conceptual framework which distinguishes between
public and private enforcement help to understand the contemporary
evolution? The public/private distinction has probably become
outdated. Often in European countries public agencies cannot enforce
violations themselves, but need to bring the claims before a court. This
constitutes judicial enforcement promoted by public agencies and
would not fit with the traditional assimilation between public and
administrative enforcement. A clearer and more useful distinction is
that between administrative and judicial enforcement. However, even
this distinction is often insufficient, given that similar remedies, with
comparable effects, can be issued by both administrative authorities
and judges. Thus, for example, the administrative versus judicial
enforcement partition cannot be explained by looking at compensation
and deterrence. In fact, the latter is often the main goal of both modes
of enforcement.
For this reason this essay advocates a remedial perspective to
consumer enforcement both for descriptive.and normative purposes. A
shift in view from enforcement to remedies reflects a loss of significance
of the enforcer's public or private nature. Further changes have
occurred and the new frontiers of cooperative enforcement, operated by
agencies and, to a limited extent, by the judiciary, reveal that the range
of .undertakings by the infringer can include commitments aimed at

nationwide class actions. Courts have developed relatively different standards in mass torts,
antitrust, securities fraud and civil rights litigation. While nationwide class actions in the U.S. are
difficult, a creative judiciary and lawyers' networks across the nation have enabled. the growth of
widespread litigation with only minor distortions. The recent reform introduced with the Class
Action Fairness Act in 2oo5 has contributed to the solution of some problems, but left many others
to conflict of laws regimes.
2 See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62
VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the
Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. s (2009) [hereinafter American
Exceptionalism]; Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus, & Niels Philipsen, Enforcement Practices For
Breaches Of ConsumerLegislation, 20 LOy. CONSUMER L. REV. 361 (2oo8).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 21:4

deterrence or compensation.3
The essay proceeds as follows: in Part I, the most recent
legislative changes in Europe are described. A brief theoretical
framework is provided in Part II in order to introduce the remedial
perspective. Part III, then, develops the remedial perspective by
focusing on coordination between injunctions and damages and the
challenges for enforcement design policies. In Part IV, issues of conflicts
of interest and accountability mechanisms are discussed to ensure not
only alignment between claimants and representatives, but also policy
consistency between compensation and deterrence, when different
modes of enforcement are deployed. A conclusion in Part V provides
some suggestions for the new European institutional framework.
PART I - THE EUROPEAN SCENARIO

_.Policingthe European Market Through Judicialand Administrative
Enforcement
The level of integration of the European consumer market has
been growing steadily. The number of cross-border transactions has
increased in the last ten years, partly due to the development of the
ICT.4 Products and services, and their respective risks, have thus
become more 'common' and the need for a coordinated strategy has
clearly emerged. This evolution has led to the development of the
European Consumer strategy for 2007-2013 on which a recent
European Parliament (EP) Resolution has provided further
suggestions.' The awareness that Europe may become one of the largest
retail markets, once full economic integration is achieved, pushes
towards combining the 'internal' market strategy with a stronger role
as a global player.6
See Fabrizio Cafaggi and Hans Micklitz, The Way Forward, in NEW FRONTIERS OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION, pp. 383 ff. (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans. Mcklitz, eds., Kluwer, 2009).
' ICT has increased the level of trade between enterprises and consumers and modified
consumers' choices. ICT has also contributed to modify enforcement policies both by adopting
spec ific ones for e-commece transactions and expanding the scope of ADR. Concerning the use of
ICT in consumer transactions see Euro. Comm., Consumer Protection In The Internal Market,
Special Eurobarometer (Oct. 2oo8), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public-opinion/archives/
ebs/ebs_298_en.pdf. According to the research, 33% of consumers in the EU27 have purchased
goods or services via the nternet in the last 12 months, either in their home country or elsewhere
(up from 27% in 2006, EU25). There is a significant variation in this figure at country level: 68% of
individuals in the Netherlands have made an online purchase in the past 12 months, while this is
true for just 4% of Bulgarians. 30% of EU consumers have made such a purchase from a retailer
in their own country, while 7% have made an online purchase from a seller or provider in another
EU country. For a broader analysis see NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 383
(Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans "Micklitz, eds., Kluwer, 20o9) [hereinafter NEW FRONTIERS OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION].

' EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013, Empowering consumers, enhancing their
welfare, effectively protecting them, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 2007) 99, SEC (2007) 321, (March 13,
2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/overviewcons-policydocEN_99.pdf.
6 European Parliament Resolution of 20 May 2oo8 on EU consumer policy strategy 20072013, at para. 12. The European Parliament "stresses that European norms in consumer policy and
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Consumer law in Europe has developed through both primary
and secondary legislation.7 While Member States' (MS) substantive
law has been strongly influenced by European legislation and
European Court of Justice case law, modes of enforcement have been
left primarily to MS, in compliance with the principle of procedural
autonomy.' It should be clarified that this principle operates both as a
gap filler and as a constraint. 9
More recently, enforcement has become a central part of
European intervention.1 ° The focus on consumer redress in antitrust
and consumer law violations confirms that the multilevel structure has
been subject to radical transformation, reducing the divide between
substantive and remedial law."1 In the last ten yearsa multi-polar
self-regulation initiatives should serve as a reference for global standards and best practices and
welcomes the fact that Europe is a trendsetter, using soft power to improve consumer rights
globally." See EC Reg. n. 2o06/2004, 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (regulation on consumer protection
cooperation), at para. io:
The enforcement challenges that exist go beyond the frontiers of the European Union
and the interests of Community consumers need to- be protected from rogue traders
based in third countries. Hence there is a need for an international agreements to be
negotiated with third countries regarding mutual assistance in of enforcement of the
laws that protect consumer interests. These international agreements should be
negotiated at Community level in the areas covered by this Regulation in order to
ensure the optimum protection of Community consumers and the smooth functioning
of enforcement cooperation with third countries.
7

See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY (Edward Elgar, 2005);

UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW (H.W. Micklitz, Norbert Reich, & Peter Rott eds.,
Intersentia, 2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW].
' See Norbert Reich, Legal Protection of Individual and Collective Consumer Interests, in
UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW, supra note 7.
' The gap filling function implies that absent Community legislation the Courts have to
refer to national legislation. See Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Landwirtschaftskammer ftir das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 33-76, at para. 2:
In the absence of Community rules on the subject it is for the domestic legal system of
each member State to designate the Courts having jurisdiction and to determine the
procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the
rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being
understood that such conditions can not be less favourable than those relating to
similar actions of a domestic nature.
On the principle of procedural autonomy and the need to rethink about the relationship between
rights remedies and procedure see Walter Van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedure, 37
COMMON MKT L. REV. 501 (2ooo); TAKIS TRIDIMAS, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW (2nd ed.,

Oxford Univ. Press, 2oo6).
"o See European Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2oo8)
794
final
(Brussels,
2oo8), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redresscons/
greenpaper-en.pdf, [hereinafter Green paper].
" For a more detailed analysis see Way Forward,supra note 3 at 383; Jules Stuyck, Class
Actions in Europe? To Opt-In Or To Opt-Out That Is the Question, EUR. BUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming, 2009); Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans W. Micklitz, Collective Enforcement of Consumer
Law: A Frameworkfor ComparativeAssessment, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 391 (2oo8) [hereinafter
Comparative Assessment]; CHRISTOPHER
HODGES, THE
REFORM OF CLASS AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE (Hart, 2o08) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE];
WILLEM VAN BOOM & MARCO. LooS, COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW,
SECURING COMPLIANCE IN EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATE GROUP ACTION AND PUBLIC
AUTHORITY INTERVENTION (Euro. Law, 2007) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSUMER LAW].
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strategy has emerged; including not only judicial (Dir. n. 1998/27) and
administrative enforcement (Reg. n. 2oo6/2004), but also promotion of12
alternative dispute resolution regimes (particularly mediation).
Specific attention has been paid to cross-border litigation concerning
small claims, resulting in a newly-enacted regulation. 3 A new proposal
on consumer rights has been recently published; 4 the proposal,
15
lamentably, does not address the issue of collective enforcement.
So far, consumer protection remains a sector-specific policy,
characterized by internal fragmentation. It does not represent an
horizontal clause, which would require impact assessment evaluation of
other policies, i.e. there is no specific duty to evaluate the impact of
general European legislation on consumer protection.' 6 The necessity to
move the field of consumer protection from a sector-specific to an
horizontal, general approach - similar to what has happened in the
environmental field - has been firmly stated by the EU Commission
and later by the European Parliament.' Such evolution would have,
among other things, deep impact on enforcement policies.
Regrettably the consumer acquis, as defined by the European
Commission, does not encompass consumer protection in regulated
markets.'" To the previously described horizontal legislation, specific
"2 See Commission Recommendation the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, n. 9 8/257/EC, European Council Res. on a
Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial settlement of consumer disputes
(2ooo), Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies
involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes (C (2ooI/ 3 Io/EC).
'3 Regulation No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of ii July 2007
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, I973 O.J. (L 199) 40.
" See Proposal For A Directive On Consumer Rights, Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 2oo8) 614/13,
(SEC 2oo8) 2544 (Aug. 10, 2oo8) on which see Hans W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, Cronicade una
muerte anonciada:The Commission proposalfor a "Directive on consumer rights," 46 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 471 (2009).

"s The general provision concerning enforcement (art. 41) leave to MS the task of defining
specific remedies with regard to control unfair terms. It leaves open the alternative between
judicial and administrative enforcement and defines the entities to be given standing, see on the
proposal, Micklitz & Reich, supra note 14.
"6 See Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
(Universal Service Directive) [OJL io8 of 24 April 2002].
17 See Review of the Acquis COM (2006) 744 final and Commission Staff Working
Document. Report on the outcome of the public consultation on the green document on the review
of the consumer acquis, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons-int/safe-shop/acuqis/index-en.htm; as
analysed in MARCO B.M. LOOS, REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN CONSUMER ACQUIS (Sellier, 20o8).

"8 The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the
Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and comprises: the
content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; the legislation adopted in application of
the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; the declarations and resolutions adopted by
the Union; measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to
justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the Community and those
concluded by the Member States between themselves in the field of the Union's activities. Thus the
Community acquis comprises not only Community law in the strict sense, but also all acts adopted
under the second and third pillars of the European Union and the common objectives laid down in
the Treaties. The Union has committed itself to maintaining the Community acquis in its entirety
and developing it further. Applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis before they
can join the Union. Derogations from the acquis are granted only in exceptional circumstances and
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European consumer legislation in regulated markets should be added:
from financial to banking, from telecom to energy.1 9 In the fields of
public utilities or financial markets specific rules concerning consumer
protection are drafted, like those related to universal services
obligations.2" It is unclear, however, whether specific regulation will be
needed in relation to the specificity of market failures or whether, once
the process of liberalization is completed, the level of rule uniformity in
consumer protection should be much higher than the current one."
The effectiveness of enforcement is an increasingly important
issue in Europe." While improvements have been made, recent surveys
suggest that the level of enforcement is still relatively low." The
application of the injunction EC Dir. 98/27 in transborder litigation is
very limited.24 The use of alternative dispute resolution is also quite
scarce.2" Currently collective redress is relegated to the limited fields of
damages actions for breach of antitrust rules and in that of consumer
protection.

are limited in scope. To integrate into the European Union, applicant countries will have to
transpose the acquis into their national legislation and implement it from the moment of their
accession (see at http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community-acquis-en.htm). The consumer
acquis encompasses all the european intervention including both legislation, soft law and ECJ case
law, related to consumer protection, which recently has been part of a revision process. See infra.
"9 See, however, the Green paper on the revision of the Acquis where the Commission has
adopted a much narrower approach excluding even product liability and product safety. See also
the Commission Staff Working paper, Report on the outcome of the public consultation on the
Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
cons int/safe-shop/acquis/acquis-working-doc.pdf, and the Preparatory Work for the Impact
Assessment on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, Analytical Report on the Green Paper on the
Review of the Consumer Aquis submitted by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium, 2007,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/ detailed-analysis en.pdf.
20 See the Universal service directive: Dir. 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services, [OJL io8 of 24 April 2002].
2 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, It diritto dei contratti nei mercati regolati:ripensare il rapporto tra
parte generale e parte speciale, 62 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 95
(2008).
22 See WILLEM VAN BOOM & MARCO LOOS, COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER
LAW: SYNCHRONIZING PRIVATE, PUBLIC, AND COLLECTIVE MECHANISMS (Erasmus Univ.,
2oo8) [hereinafter SYNCHRONIZING PRIVATE, PUBLIC, AND COLLECTIVE MECHANISMS];
ComparativeAssessment, supra note ii at 39 1; COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE, supra note i i;
The Way Forward, supra note 3 at 383; Norbert Reich, Crisis Or Future of European Consumer
Law, in YEARBOOK OF CONSUMER LAW 3 (Deborah Parry et al. eds., Ashgate, 2009).
2 See Jules Stuyck et al., An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer
Redress Other Than Redress Through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings, Study Centre for Consumer
2007) available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reportsstudies/
Law, (Jan. 17,
comparative-report-en.pdf. [hereinafter Stuyck Report] (discussing Directive 98/27/EC effects on
injunctions and its implementation and enforcement in 25 Member States).
24 According to the Commission, only two cross-border cases have been brought since the
Injunctions directive entered into force in 1998. See Report from the Commission concerning the
application of the Injunctions Directive, available at http://ec.europa.eu.consumers/enforcement/
injunctions-en-htm.
2 See European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 195, "European Union Citizens And
Access To Justice" (Oct. 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports-studies/
eurobarometer_ I-04_.en.pdf (the data show that European Citizens do not complain about
products and services very often, as 47% never complain to a salesperson, retailer or service
provider; and even when they complaint they do it only rarely).
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Administrative and JudicialEnforcement in European Consumer
Protection

The combination between administrative and judicial
enforcement in consumer protection still widely differ in the U.S. and
Europe, despite some convergence. 6 Variations are also sector specific
within consumer enforcement practices. Different national institutional
strategies emerge for both quality and safety regulation and related
risk-management issues. To some extent this is due to the fact that
national consumer policy pre-existed European intervention; and many
of those institutions have been revised, but not yet repealed. 27.
The European Green Paper on collective redress and the White
Paper on damages for antitrust violations are attempts to coordinate
enforcement policies developed at the MS level with particular, but not
exclusive focus on trans-border litigation.
Judicial enforcement presents a wide array of solutions. The
main distinction concerns individual versus aggregate litigation.
Aggregate litigation has been proposed in the field of antitrust
violations and consumer protection. Public policy arguments for
aggregate litigation are well known. 8 Of course, reservations
concerning the potential abuses have also been widely articulated. 9
Less defined, however, are the different features of these arguments in
domestic versus cross-border litigation.
Within aggregate litigation different types of proceedings are
available." To a large extent the choice of proceedings is dictated by
the law but some room is left for contractual agreements concerning
class action waivers, mandatory arbitration clauses. 1 Aggregate
26 See Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Public Versus PrivateEnforcement of Antitrust

Law: Survey, 28 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 3o6

(2007); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM
OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 223 (Hart 2oo8)
[hereinafter REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS].
27 For a detailed analysis see Fabrizio Cafaggi; A CoordinatedApproach to Regulation and
Civil Liability in European Law: Rethinking Institutional Complementarities, in THE
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 191, i91-244 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed.,
Oxford, 2oo6).
28 See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 2, and Samuel Issacharoff & Ian J. Samuel, The
Institutional Dimension of Consumer Protection, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, supra note 4, at 47. See Hans W. Micklitz, Collective Private Enforcement Of
Consumer Law: The Key Questions, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW, supra
note ii,at 13.
29 See REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, supra note .26, at 243.
o See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (American Law Institute,

Apr. 2009) [hereinafter AGGREGATE LITIGATION] at § 1.02 ("(a) An aggregate lawsuit is a single
lawsuit that encompasses claims or defences held by multiple parties or represented persons. (b)
An administrative aggregation is a collection of related lawsuits, which may or may not be
aggregate lawsuits, proceeding under a common judicial supervision or control.').
"' In relation to the U.S. Geoffrey Miller contends that States diverge: California generally
invalidates these class action waivers while New York enforces them. The Supreme Court has not
yet ruled on the issue. Geoffrey Miller, Compensation and Deterrence in Consumer Class Actions
in United States and Europe, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 4, at
234; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The ForthcomingNear-Total Demise of the Modern
Class-Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005).
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litigation, both in the U.S. and Europe, constitutes the exception whilst
individual litigation is the rule.12 Aggregation can be justified on both
efficiency and distributional grounds but within the limits of due
process.33 But rationales for aggregation should also be defined
according to the remedies. The effects of injunctive relief are often
intrinsically collective; while individual injunctions are perfectly
admissible, it is often more appropriate to use aggregate litigation in
order to enjoin. Damages, on the contrary, are generally individualized
and thus individual litigation is the rule rather than the exception.
In the EU, the White Paper on antitrust damages to consumers
has functionally distinguished public from private enforcement.34 The
latter should have a predominantly compensatory function.35 The
White Paper proposes two measures: (i) an opt-in collective action and
(ii) a representative action, brought by representative bodies, such as
Private
consumer
organizations
or administrative
agencies.36
enforcement will take place at the MS level where rules concerning
damages can differ quite significantly. The European, Commission has
proposed that Decisions concerning infringement will be binding proof
in civil proceedings for damages." The European Commission is
currently trying to define Guidance for national Courts. It will certainly
be useful to harmonize highly differentiated regimes, but horizontal
coordination will still be needed to ensure judicial cooperation at MS
level.38
The recent Green Paper on collective redress in the consumer
field deals with violations of consumer legislation. Regrettably it has
not clarified the relationship between public and private enforcement
nor that between injunctionis and damages.39 Focusing on judicial
enforcement related to aggregate litigation, the Green Paper defines
four policy options: (i) no EC action; (2) cooperation between MS's; (3)
mix of policy instruments; and (4) judicial collective redress procedure.
Within option (4) the emphasis has been on financing litigation,
preventing unmeritorious claims,, defining standing options, and
choosing between opt-in and opt-out actions. The European
Commission has articulated the rationales as well as the risks and costs

32

See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30.

Id.
I'
4 See European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of EC antitrust
rules, COM(2oo8) 165 final, (Brussels, 2oo8), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrustl
actionsdamages/files-white-paper/whitepaper-en.pdf [hereinafter White Paper].
'5 See Wouter P.J. Wils, The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and
Private Actionsfor Damages, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 3,12 (2009).

" See White Paper, supra note 34, at para. 2.1 (Commission suggesting a combination of two
mechanisms for collective redress: (i) representative actions and (ii) opt-in collective actions).
37 Id. at para. 2.3 (Commission proposes that national Courts are bound by the findings in'
Commission decisions and National Competition authority.).
" See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Making European Private Law: Governance Design, in MAKING
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 289 (F. Cafaggi & H. Muir Watt eds., Edward Elgar, 2oo8).
" See Green Paper, supra note io.
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of both opt-out and opt-in systems."
There are important constitutional and institutional issues to be
considered when designing new European rules: in particular, the
correct balance between private international law rules aimed at
coordinating different MS legislation, mutual recognition systems, and
harmonized legislation.4 1 From t constitutional perspective, legislation
at the EU level has to be justified and grounded on approximation of
laws concerning the internal market, fundamental rights to access
justice, and judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters."
Even if these rationales were considered, still the principle of
proportionality would require MS interests to be fully taken into
account.
From an institutional perspective the actors playing in cross
border litigation may need different governance structures and
coordination devices. As the North American experience shows, various
forms of networks are needed for lawyers and consumer organizations
to be able to promote effective and efficient litigation at EU level. In
the public domain coordination of judicial and administrative
enforcement is needed. While EC Reg. n. 2004/2oo6 has provided a set
of principles for administrative cooperation, foundational rules are still
missing for coordination among State judiciaries involved in consumer
aggregate litigation. 4' The complementarity between administrative
and judicial enforcement needs to be implemented by a coordinated set
4o Id. at para. 54-5 7.
41 See Way Forward,supra note 3, at 383.
42 See Michele Taruffo, Harmonising Civil Litigation in Europe?, in MAKING EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 38, at 46; for a broader view see EVA STORSKUBB, CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND EU LAW, (Oxford, 2oo8).
" See European Commission, Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(discussing general provisions concerning judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters and
those on mutual recognition of judgements). On the point see the recent judgement of the ECJ C18o/2oo6, 14 may 2oo9, not yet reported, where the court affirms that "Consequently, the answer
to the questions referred is that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in
which a consumer seeks, in accordance with the legislation of the Member State in which he is
domiciled and before the court for the place in which he resides, an order requiring a mail-order
company established in another Member State to pay a prize which that consumer has apparently
won, and
where that company, with the aim of encouraging that consumer to conclude a contract, sent
a letter addressed to him personally of such a kind as to give him the impression that he would be
awarded a prize if he requested payment by returning the 'prize claim certificate' attached to that
letter,
but without the award of that prize depending on an order for goods offered for sale by that
company or on a trial order,
the rules on jurisdiction laid down by Regulation No 44/200 must be interpreted as follows:
such legal proceedings brought by the consumer are covered by Article 150)(c) of that
regulation, on condition that the professional vendor has undertaken in law to pay that prize to the
consumer;
where that condition has not been fulfilled, such proceedings are covered by Article 15(I)(c)
of Regulation No 44/200 only if the consumer has in fact placed an order with that professional
vendor." More recently judicial cooperation in civil matters has been the focus of European
institutions. See Council Decision 2008/ 9 7 6/JHA on the European Judicial Network, 2008 O.J. (L
348) 130 (Dec. 12, 2o08).
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of rules concerning institutional cooperation among MS institutions in
the field of consumer enforcement."
The current European landscape is characterized by a relative
uniform legislation related to injunctions and a quite diversified state
legislation concerning collective redress for damages.4"
2.

. Group Actions

Thirteen MS of the EU have introduced some form of collective
redress.46 No convincing attempts have so far been made at the MS
level to integrate legislation concerning injunctions and collective
redress into a unified or coordinated system of collective judicial
enforcement. National legislation does not specifically address ways in
which consumers of different European MS can join and bring claims
before Courts, nor the extent to which national consumer organizations
should ensure adequate representation of foreign consumers.47
Transborder litigation has not been promoted with effective rules and
institutions either through centralization, or through a well designed
decentralized but coordinated enforcement system.
The Nordic systems, encompassing Finland, Sweden, Denmark,
and Norway, have enacted new legislation on group actions.4 8 They
have created specialized institutions for both monitoring (Ombudsmen)
and enforcing (Market Courts) consumer violations.4 9 These countries
rarely delegate actions to private bodies; and so the role of consumer
associations remains relatively small.5 0 In both monitoring and
enforcement there is extensive use of soft law and the Consumer
Complaint Boards act mainly by way of recommendations, which are
usually complied with. In recent years, Ombudsmen have been given
the power to provide compensation to victims of consumer law
infringements."1
England is an intermediate case, where the role of the Office of
Fair Trading, both in competition and consumer law, is very significant
in defining enforcement policies.5 2 Empowerment of private bodies has
44 On these questions see Way Forward,supra note 3; and Reich, supranote 22.
15 See Comparative Assessment, supra note i i; REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTIONS, supra note 26, at 5 1.
46 See Green Paper, supra note Io, at para. 8.
4 For a detailed analysis see Stuyck Report, supra note 23; see also European Commission,
Consumer Affairs, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Helping Consumers Seek Redress" (Apr. 2007)
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress cons/adren.htm.
" See Per Henrik Lindblom, National report Group litigation in Sweden; Erik Werlauff,
Collective redress in Danish law and perspectives at EU level; and Klaus Vittanen, Collective
Litigation in Finland.All of these articles are available at Global Class Action Project, available at
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/.
" See Klaus Vittanen, Enforcement of Consumers Collective Interests by Regulatory
Agencies in the Nordic Countries, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW, supra
note I i, at ioo; see also REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, supra note 2 6, at 27.
5o Vittanen, supra note 49.
Id.
s See Geraint Howells, Collective Consumer Redress Reform: Will It Be a PaperTiger?, in
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been driven more by European legislation and the general regulatory
reform than by the growing power of consumer associations. 3 In
relation to procedural rules, the enactment of the Group Litigation
Order (GLO) in I999 has allowed some forms of consolidation mainly
driven by consideration of judicial management rather than access to
justice.5 4 The debate over wider law reforms involving the introduction
of class actions is still open.
Germany and Austria follow a model in which private
organizations, consumer and trader organisations, play a major role in
the enforcement of consumer law. These countries are quite reluctant to
grant public authorities a prominent role, rebalancing the sharing of
responsibilities between public and private enforcement.
The Dutch system has recently been reformed. The traditional
reliance on self-regulation has been only partially revised with the
introduction of a new Agency in 2oo6." However, the newly established
Consumer Agency has rather limited regulatory powers and does not
undermine the prominent role of Dutch consumer organizations. The
reform that has introduced group litigation has promoted forms of
cooperative enforcement translating into agreements between the
infringer and the victims often supported by private associations to be
later approved by Courts. 6
The southern European countries have given a stronger role to
private associations.
In Portugal, for example, both the injunction directive and the
'group action' introduced via popular action in 1995 have been
implemented by referring to associations. Litigation has been very
limited, evident sign that DECO has used its power to negotiate ex ante

NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 329; and Christopher Hodges, Developing Approaches to Public
and Private Enforcement in England and Wales, in NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 15 1. For a
broader overview see GERAINT S. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW (MARKETS AND THE LAW) (2d ed., Ashgate, 2005). See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, at §§ ii &
205 (describing the super-complaint procedure under which organisations may address the OFT,
which is then obliged to investigate the complaint within go days).
" See Philip Hampton, "Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and
Enforcement," HM Treasury (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
budo5hamptonvi.pdf; Richard B. Macrory, "Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective,"
Better Regulation Executive (Nov. 2oo6), available at http://www.berr.gov. uk/files/file44593.pdf;
see also Legislation and Regulation Reform Act, 2006, c. 5i and Regulatory Enforcement and
Sanctions Act, 2008, c.13. But see the Enterprise Act, 2002, c.4o, at § 8 (defining the tasks and
instruments of consumer enforcement). The coordination between this general reform and that of
the Enterprise Act of 2002 especially section 8 generates a fairly complex landscape where it is
unclear if consumer regulation constitutes a 'special case' or can be nicely integrated in the more
general strategy.
" See REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, supra note 26, at 53; RACHEL
MULHERON, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective,
(Hart, 2004); Rachel Mulheron, Justice Enhanced: Framing an Opt-Out Class Action for England,
70 MOD. L. REV. 550 (2007).
" Sjoerd Ammerlaan & Dirk Janseen, The Dutch Consumer Authority: An Introduction, in
COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW, supra note i i,at 107.
56
See Ewoud Hondius, Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection:A Dutch
Perspective, in NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 235.
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with enterprises.
France probably stands above the others; but certainly in recent
times the weight and power of consumer organizations has grown both
in Italy and Spain. Public funds, like in Germany and Austria, are
given to consumer organizations to contribute to their activities,
including financing litigation.5 8
In Italy, while the main monitoring and enforcing power is still
in the hands of the Ministry for economic development, there is a
growing role of the Competition authority as a consumer protection
agency, especially after the implementation of an unfair trade practices
directive.5 9 New legislation concerning group action has been
introduced with an opt-in system but has not come into force yet."
Eastern European countries have taken different61 paths
characterized by a stronger role of administrative enforcement.
2. 2.

Injunctions

In Europe legislation confers injunctive power to both judiciary
an administrative entities. Administrative and judicial injunctions can
concur.6 2 The Injunction Dir. n. 98/27 has left MS to choose between
judicial and administrative enforcement or both. While most of the old
MS have chosen judicial enforcement, the new MS have selected both.63
There is a potential overlap between the injunctive power conferred to
administrative authorities by the implementing Act of the Directive and
those conferred directly by Regulation 2006/2004.64 In addition to the
general Directive 98/27, there are sector specific directives as that on
unfair contract terms and on unfair commercial practices which differ
as to the content and the effects of injunctions. 5
Injunctions against violations of consumer legislation can be
prohibitory and consist of orders to cease and desist from an unlawful

5 Art 52 (3) of the Portugese Constitution as amended in 1989 states that "[elveryone shall
be granted the right of popular action either personally or via associations that purport to defend
the interests in question, including the right of the aggrieved party or parties to apply for
compensation."
5' For an examination of the different sources to finance litigation in a comparative
perspective see Raffaele Torino, II finanziamento delle azioni seriali. Esperienze straniere ed
azione collettiva risarcitoria,in Analisi Giuridica dell'Economia, Class, Action!(?), 25 7 (2oo8).
5' See Italian Consumer Code art. 140.
0 See Italian Consumer Code, art. 14o his. See Sergio Chiarloni, II nuovo articolo 14o bis
del codice di consumo: azione di classe a azione collettiva?, Analisi Giuridica dell'Economia, Class,
Action!(?), lO7 (2oo8); For a comparative analysis see Geoffrey P. Miller, Punti cardine in tema di
class action negli Stati Uniti ed in Italia,in Analisi Giuridica dell'Economia, Class, Action!(?), 211
(2oo8).

61 See Antonina Bakardijeva, Public and Private Enforcement of Consumer Law in the
Member States from CEE Countries: InstitutionalChoice in the Shadow of Enlargement, in NEW
FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 70.
62 See, e.g., In Italy Tribunale di Roma 30.01.04.

63 See Bakardjeva, supra note 6j.
64 See Way Forward,supra note 3, at 430.
65 Id. at 409.
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behavior. Often however the most important regulatory functions to
perform are affirmative injunctions that order a firm to change or
rectify a business practice and/or a contractual term. While Directive
98/27 seems to limit the use of affirmative injunctions focusing
primarily on prohibition and cessation, the sector specific regimes, in
both unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices permit
wider use of affirmative injunctions.6 It should, however, be
underlined that MS have implemented Directive 98/27 in different
ways and some have broadened the content of injunctions, including
affirmative orders concerning restitution.
The most relevant distinction concerns the effects of
injunctions. The binding effects of injunctions are regulated in different
ways in each MS. Often they also vary according to the sectors. In
general the majority of MS does not give general, erga omnes effects to
the injunction, limiting them, rather, to the parties involved in
litigation.6"
At State level these differences are reduced if the regime of
injunctive relief has been regulated in a consumer code or a consumer
protection act. However, in many States differences remain
significant. 9 Many of them depend on the adoption of an in abstracto
or in concreto review.7 ° If judicial or administrative review is in
abstracto, the subject matter is the clause or the practice.7 If it is
considered unfair the judgment will bind all parties beyond those
66

See Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May I9 1998 on

injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 at art. 2 ("Actions for an
Injunction"). Some MS have implemented this directive permitting both prohibitory and
affirmative injunctions. See, e.g., Italy art. 140 Codice del Consumo where cease and desist orders
and affirmative injunctions correcting practices or clauses can be issued. See, in the Italian case
law, Trib. Rome, 23.05.2008, in Giur. It., 2oo8, 12; Tribunale Roma, 30.04.2008, Foro
it. 2oo8,1, 2679. See also Trib. Palermo 20.022008, Foro it. 20o8, 1, 2475.
67 See, e.g., in Italy Consumer Code, art. 140. See for the case law Tribunale Roma
23.05.2008.
6
See European Commission, "Report from the Commission concerning the application of
Directive 98/27 of the European parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of
consumers," [hereinafter Report on Directive 98/271 at para. 25:
In most Member States, a ruling on an application for an injunction has a mitigated
impact. It is mandatory only with respect to the case and the parties in question, i.e the
qualified entity which brought the action and the company which is subject of the
injunction. In practice this means that if a company commits and infringement
identical to that for which another company has already been convicted a new
injunction must be sought to stop the new infringement. In the same way, the
annulment of an unfair term in a contract proposed by a company does not prevent the
same company from continuing to use this unfair term in a similar contract.
6
In relation to Central Eastern European Countries, see Bakardjeva, supra note 61, at 63
(stating that "[t]he CPAs in Latvia and Bulgaria are empowered to directly intervene and require
change in contract conditions or termination of unfair contracts (Latvia S. 25/4)(6) CPA or of
misleading advertising (Bulgaria S.34 CPA)").
10 See in Italy C.A. Roma, 24.09.2002 (holding that in abstracto, collective review aims at

the cancellation of a clause insofar it is a standard contract term, but does not prevent the insertion
of that clause as a result of a negotiation between the parties). See also Cass. 21.052008, n. 13051
(upholding C.A. Roma 24.2.2002), Resp. civ. e prev. 2oo8, 12, 247 and Cass., 28.02. 2oo6, n. 4467.
1 See Marek Safjan, Lukasz Gorywoda, & Agnieszka Janczuck, Taking the Collective
Interest of Consumers Seriously: A View From Poland, in NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 17 1
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which are part of the specific trial. On the contrary, if the review is in
concreto the findings will be limited to the specific litigation and similar
cases will have to be tried ex novo.72
The Directive on Unfair Contract Terms 93/13 allows a court to
enjoin different enterprises or trade associations, while also
recommending or imposing contractual terms. 3 In these cases the
injunction can be imposed on an entire industry in order to delete an
unfair term from a contract.74 MS have deployed different rules in the
implementation and only some of them have given injunctions general
effects. 5 However, the individual members of the trade association are
bound by the judgment only if they took part in the litigation.
In the domain of unfair commercial practices (EC Dir. n.
2005/29) ("UCPD") if an unfair practice is recommended by a trade
association or practiced by more than one enterprise the injunction can
be addressed to all the enterprises, members of the specific industry,
that have adopted the practice or have subscribed to a code that
permits the unfair practice. 6 In relation to judicial enforcement, the
individual enterprise is bound by the judgment only if it took part in
the litigation. In many MS enforcement has been attributed to
administrative agencies which issue injunctions whose effects are often
binding beyond the litigants.
Clearly the possibiliy that (i) a judicial injunction declares a
certain clause or practice unfair, and thus unlawful, and (ii) that this
applies to future litigants reinforces the regulatory functions of judicial
enforcement. If the same applies in the context of a claim for damages
the market policing power of judges would become extremely relevant.
The differences, mainly based on procedural rules untouched by the
directives, do not currently allow the deployment of consumer judicial
enforcement as an effective regulatory strategy to police market
practices.

7' This distinction is often applied to individual and collective litigation. In abstracto review
refers to litigation on unfair terms or practices challenged by consumer or trade organisations,
while in concreto review is generally applied to individual litigation. See in the Italian case law
Trib. Roma, 2nd May 2007, in Resp. civ., 2008, 426.
7' See European Council of the Communities, Council Directive 9 3 /I3/EEC of 5 April 1993
on unfair terms in consumer contracts, at art. 7, para. 2 [hereinafter Directive 93/13].
74 Id. at art. 7.3; see also Way Forward,supra note 3.
7' This has happened in relation to unfair contract terms. See Report on Directive 98/27,
supra note 68, at para. 26 (describing what happens in various MS jurisdictions when court rules
that a contract term is unfair).
76 See Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ii May 2005
concerning concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market
and amending Council Directive 84/45o/EEC, Directives 9 7 /7/EC, 9 8/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2oo6/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council [2005 O.J. (L 149) 22] [hereinafter Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive]. See in the Italian case law, Trib. Roma, 30.0.2004, in Danno e Resp., 2004, 873, with
comment of R. Conti, Inibitoriacollettiva, pubblicita"ingannevole e ritardidel vettore aereo; see
also Way Forward,supra note 3.
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PART II - CHOICE OF ENFORCERS AND CHOICE OF REMEDIES:
FRAMING THE REMEDIAL PERSPECTIVE

3. Enforcers and remedies
Presently, enforcement policies in consumer law provide a wide
variety of alternative strategies concerning both the enforcers and the
available remedies.
The choice of enforcers concern primarily the alternative/
complementarity between judicial and administrative enforcement.77 It
should be noted here that ex ante regulation is not being contrasted
with ex post private enforcement; but rather administrative with
judicial enforcement. While the two modes of enforcement may have
different requisites they both operate as reaction to the infringement
which does not exclude a deterrence function.
The approaches might differ: they can be seen as substitutes or
complements. While I have advocated elsewhere the approach of
institutional complementarity as the best theoretical approach, in
current European consumer protection law often the two modes of
enforcement are overlapping, while in some areas neither operates.78
In order to investigate the complementarity it is important to
look at both substantive and procedural rules which give claimants the
choice between the two modes of enforcement or the possibility of using
them both, simultaneously or sequentially. Conventionally, Europe has
been depicted as administrative enforcement oriented, while the U.S.
has been described as private enforcement based. The divergence,
however, is decreasing. At first sight convergence between the U.S. and
Europe is occurring: the former has increased the role of administrative
agencies while the latter has introduced aggregate litigation. Is the rise
of judicial enforcement in Europe a sign of .weakness of public
enforcement? I do not believe that the growing legislation on aggregate
litigation in Europe should be interpreted as a response to the failure of
administrative enforcement. Rather the rise in aggregate litigation
should be viewed as evidence that ex post accountability can improve
the effectiveness of consumer legislation if sequential enforcement
between public and private is well engineered.

7' This alternative is often described as that between public and private enforcement looking
more at standing than at the nature of the enforcers. Judicial enforcement, however cannot be
entirely identified with private since often claimants seeking remedies are public actors, agencies
or ombudsmen. For this reason it is preferable to speak of judicial and administrative rather than
public and private.
78 Consumer protection is traditionally broken down into protection of consumer economic
interests by means of contract and tort law (private law), and protection of consumer health and
safety by means of public law. For a more detailed analysis see Way Forward,supra note 3, at 383;

and Comparative Assessment, supra note ii, at 391.
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4. Divisible and Indivisible Remedies

.The choice of enforcers and eventually the form of enforcement
may be affected by differences between divisible and indivisible
remedies (damages and injunctions for example). 79 Various remedies
require particular due process requirements in the U.S., and to a more
limited extent, in Europe."°
i) When the remedy is damages and compensation- the primary
goal, judicial enforcement is often the dominant available strategy.
Only recently have public enforcers been given standing to seek
compensation on behalf of injured parties. But they still need to seek
damages before a Court on behalf of injured consumers. In Europe the
most illustrative example is provided by Scandinavian countries where
Ombudsmen have been given the power to seek compensation both in
addition to injunction or as a single separate remedy before a Court. In
England the OFT has direct power to enforce both competition and
consumer protection laws and power to seek remedies before a Court.81
As we shall see within unfair commercial practices administrative
agencies have been given the power to ask infringers for commitments
including both injunctive relief and damages. Cooperative enforcement
often includes hybrids. Still in the majority of cases damages can be
sought before a Court by a private entity, being an association or an
individual acting as a representative of a group.
2) The case for injunctions is different. Injunctions can be
sought before a Court or before an administrative entity, either a
government office or an independent agency. Here the choice about
enforcers is open and it might depend on several factors.
3) A third hypothesis, the one I focus in this contribution, is
.where claimants seek both divisible and indivisible remedies and face
choices concerning enforcers and remedies.
In general when both remedies are sought different strategies
are available: a) to look for a single enforcer, generally the Court,
b) to separate enforcement strategies while maintaining
coordination. That is, the claimants can seek damages before Courts
and injunction before administrative agencies and decide to bring the
claims simultaneously or sequentially.
Claimants can thus act either:
bi) sequentially (in general seeking an injunction before an
79 See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30, at § 2.04 ("(a) Divisible remedies...entail the
distribution of relief to one or more claimants individually, without predetermining in practical
effect the application or availability of the same remedy to any other claimant. (b) Indivisible
remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter
determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants.").
" AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30, at § 2.04; and in relation to Rule 23 (b) (2) and (3)
text and footnotes below.
"' See REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, supra note 26, at 51.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 2 1:4

administrative entity and then, if granted, asking for damages
the Court, or seeking injunction before a Court and damages
another Court); or
b2) simultaneously (seeking an injunction and damages
the same Court, different Courts or an administrative agency
Court).

before
before
before
and a

5.Litigation, Negotiationand the Choice of Enforcement
To what extent is the selection of enforcement mode and that of
remedy driven by the choice between adjudication and negotiation?
Choice of enforcement may depend on whether the main aim of
claimants is judgment or settlement; and whether the remedy sought is
injunction or compensation.
Claimants may use enforcement strategies to increase their
negotiating powers. Enforcement rights in Europe have often been used
to negotiate rules in order to ensure better compliance by enterprises.
This mechanism has in part been institutionalized by the injunction
directive 98/27 which requires prior consultation aimed at negotiating
the remedy." Unintentionally, European consumer enforcement law
has increased bargaining in the shadow of (threatened) litigation. In
Europe litigation has been a driver for negotiations more than a direct
form of regulation.8 3 Unlike the U.S. model of regulation through
litigation, the European model can be described as bargaining through
or 'in the shadow' of litigation. To what extent these negotiations
translate into ex post regulation has to be further explored. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to investigate on how the different available
remedies can affect negotiation and its outcome, namely whether a
rule granted to claimants may affect defendants'
property or a liability
84
negotiation strategy.
6. On Which FactorsDoes the Choice of Remedies Depend?
6. 1. Size of Claims and Modes of Enforcement
Choice of enforcement may depend on substantive law issues
concerning both liability and remedies.8 " The size of damages, in
82 See Directive 98/27, supra note 68, at art. 5 ("Prior Consultation"). In Italy, for example

the consultation in mandatory and lack of prior consultation prevents the consumer organisation
from bringing the action before Court. See Tribunale Roma 23.05. 2oo8, in Foro it. 2008, 1, 2674.
83 See Geoffrey Miller, Compensation and Deterrence in Consumer Class Actions in the
United States and Europe, in NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 263.
' See generally, J. Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006).
o
85 See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3 ,at § 2.03 ("... the Court (a) may authorize
aggregate treatment of a common issue concerning liability by a way of class action when
substantive law separates that issue from the choice and distribution of appropriate remedies and
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particular its variance among classes of consumers, may affect the
incentives to bring claims and the choice of enforcement.86 Within
aggregate litigation the size of damages per individual consumer may
differ. This explains in the U.S. both the degree and the features of
aggregate litigation in consumer class action, antitrust, and mass torts.
The typical consumer class actions are generally associated with small
claims related to economic losses, antitrust class actions are related to
higher economic losses, and mass torts with personal injuries claims,
generally of higher value than economic losses. However, in the field of
mass torts the specificity associated to personal injuries has suggested a
much more cautious approach on the use of class actions in the U.S."
The size of the various claims affects the agency relationship
between representatives and plaintiffs which in turn may influence
choices of enforcement and the type of remedies. The smaller the size of
individual claims the lower the claimants' incentives are to monitor,
and the higher the risk of opportunism. Clearly the size of the claims is
relevant for damages; but not for injunctions. where incentives to
monitor are defined differently.
The agency relationship should be thought as both the premise
and the consequence of the institutional framework of enforcement
mechanisms. It is the premise because the size of the claim is an
independent variable, but is also the consequence because, given an
agency relationship where monitoring costs are very high, the
enforcement mechanism can favor accountability of the representatives
when 'spontaneous incentives to align lack.' This in turn may favor or
disfavor aggregation and contribute to the increase or decrease in the
number of claimants.
6. 2. Incentives of Representatives in Aggregate Litigation

One relevant set of variables concerning the choice of remedies
and that of enforcement depends on the incentives of the
representative(s), partly associated with the systems of funding
litigation. 8 In Europe there are three main potential representatives in
consumer
enforcement:
public
entities (ombudsmen
in the
Scandinavian countries, OFT in England), 9 consumer associations, and
from other issues concerning liability; and (b) may authorize aggregate treatment of both common
issues of liability and individual issues of remedy by way of a class action when a determination of
the liability issues, in practical effect, will determine both the choice of remedy and the method for
its distribution on an individual basis.").
" See Issacharoff, Group Litigationof Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,
34 TEX. INT'. L.J. 135, 149 (1999) (claiming that variance between individual claims suggest that
aggregate litigation- is strongly recommended in low value/low variance claims, recommended in
low variance/high value claims while is problematic when variance is high).
8" See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997) (holding that mass tort
cases are usually not appropriate for class treatment).
For a detailed analysis see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 2.
89
See Gerrit Betlem, Public and Private Enforcement of EU Consumer Law, in
COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW, supra note ii, at 37; and Roger Van Bergh,
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a lead plaintiff, generally represented by a law firm or a network of law
firms. European legislation has given the lead to consumer
organizations and public bodies in litigation concerning injunctions,
while a more balanced approach has been adopted in relation to group
actions." In the U.S. the private attorney general model has given a
dominant role to plaintiffs law firms and relegated public interest law
firms and consumer organizations to a secondary role." In this context
the role of the plaintiffs' bar to provide effective rules has also been a
crucial feature." But this balance changes in other fields of aggregate
litigation like fundamental rights or, to a limited extent, employment
discrimination.
The choice of remedies is affected by the incentives of the
representative which may or may not be (perfectly) aligned with those
represented or at least with all of them. 3
Aggregate litigation presents specific features of conflicts of
interests related to the lawyer-client relationship which require a more
active supervision by Courts. 4 In relation to consumer organizations
the potential conflict may concern members versus non members if the
former, given membership rights, have stronger voice than the latter.
Both the decision on whether and how aggregation should
occur is influenced by conflicts of interest between principals and
agents, which partly depend on the level of heterogeneity of claims and
Should Consumer Protection Law be Publicly Enforced? An Economic Perspective on EC
Regulation 2oo6/2oo4 and its Implementation in the Consumer Protection Laws of the Member
States, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW, supra note i i, at 179 (arguing in

favor of strong public enforcement).
'0

See Directive 98/27, supra note 68, at art. 3 ("Entities qualified to bring an action").

9I For a historical perspective mainly focused on the U.S. see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS AND THE REMAKING
OF AMERICAN LAW (Harvard Press, 2004); THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND
LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Univ. of California
Press, 2002); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW,

(Harvard Press, 2001). For a comparative perspective see Way Forward, supra note 3; and
Comparative Assessment, supra note i i.
"2 However the high level of discretion while exercising its regulatory functions has often
translated into an accountability deficit. On these questions see John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic
Legalism, American Style: Private BureaucraticLegalism and the Governance of the Tort System,
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261 (2007).
93 Miller, supra note 83, at 230.

This principle is well recognized in the U.S, and Canada.
See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3o:

...
(a)
As necessary conditions to the aggregate treatment of related claims by way of a
class action the Court shall determine that there are no structural conflicts of interest
between the named parties or other claimants and the lawyers who would represent
the claimants on an aggregate basis among the claimants themselves that would
present a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the
conduct of the litigation so as to favour some claimants over others on grounds aside
from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally
vis-a-vis the lawyers themselves.
For Canada see Court of Appeal for Ontario, Fantl and Transamerica, 2009 ONCA 377, par. 39
"The existence of the absent class members, among other factors, is the reason that the court's
supervisory jurisdiction is engaged from the inception of an intended class proceeding. It continues
throughout the states of the proceeding until a final disposition, including the implementation of
the administration of a settlement or, where applicable, a resolution of individual issues."

2009]

The Great Transformation

classes of consumer claimants.9 5 The selection of representatives occurs

in different ways in the U.S. and Europe.96 In neither system is the
choice of the agent primarily made by the principals, thereby posing
severe misalignment problems.
Profit driven law firms, public interest law firms, and consumer
organizations have different incentives, leading to divergent and
potentially conflicting litigation and settlement strategies. For this
reason legislation allowing different representatives in aggregate
litigation is more desirable than one granting, de jure or de facto, quasi
monopoly standing to one category."
Conflicts of interests may concern different classes of claimants.
They differ for factual reasons, some of them have already been
harmed, while others will likely be harmed in the future. Conflicts may
also arise because claimants have different preferences over remedies.
Some of them may prefer injunctions and enforce the prohibition
seeking product withdrawal or stopping the unfair commercial practice;
others may want to monetize their entitlement and transform a
property rule into a liability rule through settlement. Amchem, decided
by U.S. Supreme Court, constitutes a good illustration of conflicting
classes of claimants who should not be represented by the same
lawyer.9" The ALI Principles have proposed judicial review of
compliance with the duty of loyalty, distinguishing the criteria to be
deployed from those related to conflicts of interests in settlements.99
In relation to consumer organizations the potential conflict may
concern members versus non members. How are consumer
organizations bound to take into account the general interest of
consumers and in particular those who are non members? When
consumer organizations are asked to represent the consumer collective
interest, in proceedings seeking injunctions, they certainly owe a duty
of loyalty to members. It is unclear, however, which duties are owed to
non members who are seeking injunctive relief. In particular, it is
unclear how non members can affect the choices of enforcement and
remedies outside of membership rights. Both the legal framework and
the practices reveal an accountability deficit which may affect the
selection of claims and the choice of enforcement modes. 100
The disparity on accountability between the U.S. and Europe is
wide probably because the U.S. experience has generated more refined
rules, while most of the recent European legislation does not address
"' See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375

(2007).

•96 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) ("Appointing Class Counsel"). In Europe the injunction directive
does not define a selection process and only constrains the choices within the organizations in the
list made public every year by the European Commission. For group actions the selection varies
from MS to MS. In the International civil Litigation Draft conflict of interest plays a major role.
For example, it is a precondition for the choice of representative.
9 See Comparative Assessment, supra note i i.
s See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-27. "
99 See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30, at § 2.o8; see id. at § 2.o8 (comment f).
"oo See Way Forward,supra note 3; Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 2, at 193-96.
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but for few exceptions, the issues of conflicts of interests in relation

either to consumer organisations or to law firms.'' The U.S. model has
developed rules concerning the classical private general attorney model
combining loyalty, voice and exit, while less has been done when NGOs
or other consumer organizations bring the claims. 102
The specificity of these conflicts of interests is also related to the
fact that in aggregate. litigation, at least in the US, the issue is regulated
not by contract, as it happens in individual and consolidated litigation,
but by the aggregation itself.1°3 The decision concerning certification
and the modes of aggregation are relevant to address and prevent
conflicts of interests among different classes of claimants. Judicial
review of loyalty is thus strategic and the judge has often been defined
as the fiduciary of the class. Opt-in systems may reduce these problems
to the extent that parties should be able to define representatives before
opting-in. However, since most of the times, even in opt-in regimes, the
litigation strategy is not subject to negotiation preceding access to the
class, conflicts of interests are likely to arise there as well.
To sum up: incentives and conflicts of interests affect the choice
of remedy both in litigation and at time of settlement when they
diverge. A distinction is made between structural conflicts of interests
that pre-exist the litigation and those that arise during the litigation and
may concern the settlements. Different rules take care of these conflicts
in the U.S. system while in Europe the issue is still unsettled.' 4
7. Choice of Enforcement Mechanisms and Structure of the Marketfor
Legal Services
The selection of modes of enforcement is affected by the
competitiveness and maturity of the market for legal services. The main
differences between the U.S. and EU are related to the dominance of
different representatives: in the U.S. the strong presence of plaintiff's
lawyers, in Europe consumer associations and public bodies.' 5 These
institutional differences represent broader distinctions concerning
models of regulatory capitalisms.' °6
101 See Judge Posner's opinion in In re Rhone Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F. 3 d 1293 (7th Cir.

1995); Castano v. Tobacco Co. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
102
See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:
an Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV 1571 (2004) (claiming "the
American preference for adversarial legalism over public hierarchical bureaucracy often results in
private systems of informally aggregated settlement that bear a closer resemblance to public
compensation systems that Kagan allows"). See John C. Coffee, Class Action Accountability:

Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
-o See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30, at § 2.07 comment (d) ("Loyalty as

protection against structural conflicts of interest").
104 Id.
'01 See Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 2.
'06 See

PETER

A. HALL

AND

DAVID SOSKICE,

VARIETIES

OF

CAPITALISM:

THE

(Oxford, 2001). In relation
mainly to European neo-corporatist model see COLIN CROUCH & WOLFGANG STREECK, THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
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This picture, however, needs further qualification. On the U.S.
side, while certainly the private attorney general model, being mainly
profit driven, developed in the most profitable areas of litigation, the
others have been covered by public interest law-firms and NGO's. The
market for legal services is certainly mature but at least in certain areas
not highly competitive. 1o7
In Europe consumer organizations have been key players.
European legislation on injunctions has provided them with legal tools
to engage into transborder litigation." 8 The effectiveness of the
framework is unclear." 9 The level of litigation is low and remarkable
differences exist across MS, especially between western and eastern
European countries."' The market for legal services in collective
consumer litigation is just now emerging. The recent law reforms have
attracted the interest of U.S. law firms and have brought about
governance changes in European law-firms to establish coordinated
strategies for trans-border class actions. Many of these changes are also
driven by the re-location of global litigation from the U.S. to Europe."'
8. The Conflicts Between Deterrence and Compensation:The Remedial
Perspective
The choice of enforcement modes has conventionally been
correlated to different goals: administrative with deterrence and
judicial with compensation. But the debate over class actions has
highlighted that, especially in relation to small individual claims, the
main function of aggregate litigation is deterrence and the legal
framework should be defined accordingly."'
Thus, judicial enforcement fosters deterrence when injunctive
relief is sought or when pecuniary remedies are the main drivers but
individual claims are small. 3 Judicial enforcement primarily promotes
compensation when pecuniary remedies are sought for larger individual
sizes. Since both administrative and judicial enforcement, in negative
value suits, are primarily aimed at deterrence, the choice between them
DIVERSITY OF DEMOCRACY: CORPORATISM, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (Edward

Elgar, 2o06).

107 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions:

Why "Exit" Works Better Than "Voice", 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 407 (2oo8) (arguing that opt-out

mechanisms should be devised in order to improve competition among plaintiff lawyers).
's

See generally Report on Directive 98/27, supra note 68.

109 Id.

11 See Bakardjeva, supranote 61, at 7o; and Safjan, et al., supra note 71, at 070.
... See Nagareda, American Exceptionalism, supra note 2.
...See Coffee, Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions, supra note 1o7;
and John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its
Implementation, io6 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2o66).
113 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 748 ("[The] most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a

class action [is] the existence of a negative value suit'); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F.
Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (2006) ("negative value claims" are

claims in which the costs of enforcement in an individual action would exceed the expected
individual recovery.")
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should be based on a comparative institutional analysis and their
14
ability to coordinate with secondary goals such as compensation.'
This perspective can only partially explain the complementarity
between the two modes, given on. the one hand the role of injunction in
judicial enforcement, clearly aimed at deterring unlawful conduct, and,
on the other hand, the development of compensation schemes, governed
by administrative bodies on the basis of administrative law. Thus,
especially in relation to deterrence, it is the combination between
different types of remedies, primarily injunctions and damages, that
should be considered in choosing between judicial and administrative
enforcement.
The identification of different goals concerning administrative
and judicial enforcement is only the first step in defining the quality of
complementarity. Within each mode and especially within judicial
enforcement tensions and even conflicts may exist between
compensation and deterrence."' These tensions require that policy
priorities are well defined but also call for rules of conflicts of interests,
enabling classes' subdivision according to their preferences while
giving injured parties adequate representation." 6
PART III - COORDINATING INJUNCTIONS AND PECUNIARY
REMEDIES: DIFFERENT STRATEGIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT

io. CoordinationBetween Injunctions And Pecuniary Remedies
The remedial perspective calls for an examination of the
various remedies and their scope in aggregate litigation. I will first
analyze the degree and modes of coordination between the two classes
of remedies and then consider the conflicts of interest associated with
classes of claimants seeking different remedies for the same
infringement. The main challenges for an effective system of aggregate
litigation in Europe are not related to the existing lack of coordination
among enforcers; but, rather, to the absence of a regulation concerning
conflicts of interests among different classes of consumers and between
consumers and competitors." 7
When there are negative value law suits, clearly the main goal
is deterrence, but when the level of individual compensation grows then
the two functions, deterrence and compensation, are combined."' In
Europe the main rationale for the introduction of aggregate litigation at
See Issacharoff, supra note 95.
See Miller, supra note 83, at 263.
116 See below text and footnotes.
14

See supra note 89.
... See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Interventions Creating Subsidies and
"'

Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, I48 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000);
and Coffee, supra note 1o7; Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 2, at i86.
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the MS level has been indicated as compensation, while deterrence is
mainly pursued through the use of injunctions-both judicial and
administrative." 9 The remedial distinction more than the juxtaposition
between administrative and judicial enforcement can explain when
deterrence prevails over compensation.
In Europe the possibility of integrating into a single lawsuit
different remedies is still very limited in aggregate litigation yet
commonly admitted in individual litigation.Y° The general rule is that
evidence of violations gathered in the proceeding concerning injunctive
relief cannot be used to ask for damages by individual claimants in
different proceedings. This implies high costs of replicating litigation to
seek different remedies for the same infringement. In addition, the
limited reach of res judicata concerning an injunction may require
additional evidence even where, exceptionally, claimants seeking
damages can rely on the conclusions reached in the proceeding on
injunctive relief. Similar issues arise in the context of aggregate
litigation taking place before courts in different MS except for the
application of Regulation 44/2001 on mutual recognition.
In the U.S. aggregate litigation may include both injunctive
relief and damages. 12 1 In the language of class actions these are
functionally distinguished in divisible and indivisible remedies. 2 They
may be sought simultaneously or sequentially. 123 Aggregation for
12 4
indivisible remedies is held to be desirable and, at times, mandatory.
Aggregation for divisible remedies requires a more complex analysis
concerning the value and variance of claims involved.
Aggregation through class actions has to follow the
19
120

See White Paper, supra note 34; and Green Paper, supra note io.
Significant differences exist between aggregate litigation seeking injunctive reliefs and

that seeking pecuniary rewards. Individual rights are not considered insuperable obstacles to
collective redress. In the area of injunctions opt-out rights are often reduced or eliminated, in that
of damages individual rights are given greater importance but limitations to op-out are still held
admissible. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp. 27 U.S. 815 (1999); Molski v. Gleich 318 F. 3 d 937,
948-49 (9 th Cir. 2003).
1I
The former are regulated under Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) while the latter are regulated by
2 3 (b)(3 ). See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30, at § 2.04: The Court may authorize
aggregate treatment of common issues concerning an indivisible remedy by way of a class action,
with no requirement under § 2.08 that claimants must be afforded an opportunity to exclude
themselves from such treatment. Aggregate treatment as to an indivisible remedy may be
appropriate, even though additional divisible remedies are also available that warrant individual
treatment or aggregate treatment with the opportunity of claimants to exclude themselves, as
specified in § 2.07.
The distinction between divisible and indivisible referred to in note 121, supra, is
"'
articulated by the Courts in relation to several variables. See, e.g., Allen v. Int'l Truck & Engine
Corp., 358 F. 3 d 4 6 9 (7th Cir. 2004); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256-58
( 5 th Cir. 1974). See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 30, at § 2.04.
123 See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products Liability Litigation, 209
F.R.D. 323, (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("courts generally allow plaintiffs in class actions to sue for injunctive
relief on behalf of the class and then bring damages claims in subsequent individual actions'
(citing Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F. 3 d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir.1996); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 2024,
1031 (1ith Cir.1993); Norris v. Slothouber, 718 F.2d s116, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1983)).
o
124 See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3 , at § 2.07 comment h. ("Mandatory
Allen,
358 F. 3 d at 471.
see
also
indivisible
remedies');
to
manage
aggregation
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requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) in relation to
declaratory judgments and injunctive relief and those of Rule 23(b)(3)
in relation to damages.'25 Different due process requirements arise in
the two contexts. Rule 23(b)(3) states requirements to be added to those
defined in Rule 23(a), i.e numerosity, commonality, typicality and
adequacy of representation." 6 It permits individualized monetary
damages, allows opt-out, and imposes notice requirements. 127 Rule
23(b)(2) , on the other hand, does not allow opt-out, nor is personal
notice necessary. 128 Unlike Rule 23(b)(3 ) which requires predominance
and superiority, Rule 23(b)(2) requires only that "the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
' 29
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.'
In class actions aimed at injunctive relief all wrongdoers who need to
30
be restrained have to be involved.
These requirements differ especially in relation to
predominance and superiority which have to be added to those under
Rule 23(a).13 1 Classcertification under 23(b)(3) is considered unsuitable
if proof of essential elements of the cause of actions requires individual
treatment. 32 In general the use of Rule 23(b)(3) is more frequently used
for breach of contract claims and for economic losses and property
harm than mass torts. 3 3 When personal injuries are involved-often
this is the case in mass torts-courts are more reluctant to grant class
121
See Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments
for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. OF LITIG. 691, 7o6-o9 (2006). The nature of equitable
relieves concerning 23(b)(2) allows different types of remedies other than injunctions. Class actions
under 2 3 (b)(2) can include restitution, disgorgement, constructive trust, equitable estoppel and
rescission.
12
For a detailed examination see In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practices
Litigation 148 F. 3 d 283, 309 (3 d Cir. i998).
Ill
These have been articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Phillips
Petroleum v. Shutts 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
'
See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F. 3 d 402 (5th Cir. 1998); see RICHARD A.
NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 193
(Foundation Press, 2009).
129 See supra note 121.
130 See, e.g., U.S. v. Paccione, 964 F.2d 1269, 127 4 -75(2d Cir. 1992).
131 See Amchem, 523 U.S. 591, 613-15 ("In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites,
parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 2 3 (b)(i),
(2), or ()."); see also, Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F. 3 d 305, 310 (3rd Cir. 2008)
("Under predominance requirement for class certification issues common to class must
predominate over individual issues.").
132 See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F. 3 d at 312 ("In antitrust cases, impact is often critically
important for the purpose of evaluating Rule 23 (b) (3)'s predominance requirement because it is
an element of the claim that my call for an individual, as opposed to common proof."); see In re
New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, 522 F. 3 d 6, 20 (ist Cir. 2oo8) ("In
antitrust class actions, common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the
fact of antitrust impact can not be established through common proof.'); Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (sth Cir. 2003) ("[Wjhere the fact of damage cannot be established for
every class member through the proof common to the class, the. need to establish antitrust liability
for individual class members defeats Rule 23(bX3) predominance.").
133 See, e.g., Vioox litigation where class actions have not been held viable. MDL-1657 Vioxx
Products Liability Litigation, available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov..
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certification, and bifurcation may be required or two separate actions
might be necessary.1 4 Specifically, in many mass torts proximate cause
may differ among different plaintiffs, and so aggregate treatment is
more difficult.135 The same requirements, though, do not apply to Rule
23(b)(2).
The regime of Rule 2 3 (b)(2) changes when, in addition to
injunctive relief, damages are sought. Due process requires that some of
with Rule 23(b)(3) are applied in hybrid
the requirements associated
36
class actions as well.
Hybrid class actions may encompass multiple claims, including
injunctive relief and compensatory and/or punitive damages. Federal
Courts in the U.S. are split in relation to certification of hybrid class
actions, in particular on whether the less restrictive requirements for
injunctive relief can apply to pecuniary remedies, regulated by
23(b)(3)."' Some courts require damages to be merely incidental.'38
"' See Cooper v. Southern Co., 39o F. 3 d 695, 721 (iith Cir. 2004) (holding that class
certification was not warranted because injunctive relief was appropriate).
' See, e.g., Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 461 F. 3 d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2oo6);
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 96, 153, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 113 P. 3 d iToo, where the
court affirmed that waiver of class arbitration in a consumer contract of adhesion is
unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced, when it occurs in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme
to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at
least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in
practice the exemption of the party from responsibility for its own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § i668; see America Online, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 90 Cal.App.4th i, io8 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, where the court affirmed that Consumers
Legal Remedies Act's (CLRA) anti-waiver provision would be violated by enforcement of forum
selection clause in service agreement to require former subscribers in California to bring suit in
Virginia due to internet service provider's (ISP) alleged conduct in continuing to debit their credit
cards for monthly service fees after they terminated their subscriptions, where Virginia law would
not allow subscribers to bring class actions, and there would also be limitations regarding
injunctive relief, no punitive damages or enhanced remedies for disabled and elderly, reduced
recovery for unintentional acts, shorter period of limitations, and use of lodestar formula to
calculate attorney fees. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1750 et seq.
136 See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Group, 51 F. 3 d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
117 The debate has arisen in relation to the interpretation of the statement made by the rules
advisory committee where it was stated: "The subsidivion does not extend to cases in which the
appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages." The most
important divide is between the Fifth and Seventh Circuit on the one hand and the Second Circuit
on the other. The former deny certification while the latter allows certification of hybrid class
actions. Allison, iS

F.3d 402; Jefferson v. Ingersoll Intern. Inc., 195 F. 3 d 894 (7th Cir. i999);

Robinson v. Metro North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F. 3 d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). While the Fifth and
the Seventh Circuit require damages to be incidental, the Second Circuit, in Robinson, permits
class certification if "the positive weight or value ... of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought is
predominant even though compensatory or punitive damages are also claimed, and class treatment
would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable measure of judicial
economy." Robinson, 267 F. 3 d at 164 (citing Allison, ISi F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting)). See
Sherman, supra note 133, at 709 (the split between the circuits goes not only to impediments to
hybrid class actions and bifurcation, but also to fundamental disagreement as to predominance
and cohesiveness in class actions, and would seem to require Supreme Court review at some
point).
"' This is the position of the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit. See Allison, I5 1 F. 3 d 402
followed by Bolin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 231 F. 3 d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000); see Allison, i F. 3 d,
at 402 (defining incidental damages); Bolin, 23i F. 3 d at 976.
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Other Courts allow wider discretion and grant certification for
compensatory damages.' 39 Some Courts allow not only compensatory
but also punitive damages. Damages in hybrid class actions should not
require an individualized analysis.
The distinction concerns damages that can be calculated on a
standardized basis and damages that require individual computation.
The former allow integration between the two remedies and
coordination between deterrence and compensation within same
proceedings; the latter, however, impose a separate inquiry and thus
may bring about divergent results. Consensus exists, though, on the
necessity that, even in the absence of monetary recovery, plaintiffs
would have had reasons to seek injunctive relief and that these
remedies would be appropriate if plaintiffs were successful on the
merits.14
When both rules, 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) can apply courts should
treat the suit as having been brought under 23(b)(2) thus forcing all the
class members to be bound. The purpose of mandatory class treatment
is to avoid inconsistency. 141

Courts, however, may define subclasses in relation to the
remedies sought and subject them to the different rules. In hybrids,
questions of commonality may appear different in relation to indivisible
and divisible remedies. 4 2 Also, the adequacy of representation may
vary in relation to different remedies sought in the. same class actions.
The issue arises especially when class
actions seeking both injunctive
43
and monetary relief are bifurcated. 1
In Europe the question of hybrid collective litigation is just now
emerging since group actions have only recently been introduced but no
proposals for coordination have been so far made. Coordination
between injunctions and other remedies exists more for specific areas
than as a general policy. Neither the injunction directive nor the new
legislation on class actions specifically address the interplay between

13'
This is the position of the Second and Ninth Circuits. See Robinson, 67 F. d 147; and
3
Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003).
140 See Robinson, 267 F. 3 d at 164 ("[b]efore allowing [23](b)(2) certification a district court

should, at a minimum, satisfy itself of the following: (i) even in the absence of a possible monetary
recovery, reasonable plaintiff would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought; and (2) the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably necessary and
appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits').
"' According to the rules advisory committee: "One person may have rights against or be
under duties toward numerous persons constituting a class, and be so positioned that conflicting or
varying adjudications in lawsuits with individual members of the class might establish
incompatible standards to govern his conduct." See CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2oo8), at § 1784.1
("Certification of Hybrid Class Actions").
142 See Allison, 151 F. d 402 ("...proposed (b)(2) classes need not withstand a court's
3
independent probe into the superiority of the class action over other available methods of
adjudication or the degree to which common issues predominate over those affecting only
individual class members, as (b)( 3 ) classes must.").
' See in Re Methyl Tertiary Ether, 209 F.R.D. 323.
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44
the two remedies in the context of aggregate litigation.'
In Europe judicial enforcement results from the combination of
injunctions and different types of pecuniary remedies. While the formerhave been primarily introduced through European legislation and the
latter by MS legislation, the two sets of remedies should often be
integrated in practice.145 However only few MS while enacting the new
legislation on group representative actions have taken an integrated
approach. Few exceptions exist allowing the use of the findings in
collective procedure to ask for individualized damages.

ii. Complex Hybrids: Injunctions, Invalidity, and Damages in Unfair

Contract Terms, Unfair Commercial Practicesand Product Safety
Let us now examine the European legislation concerning
remedies in unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices and
product safety to verify the existent level of coordination between
different remedies and the open issues for an integrated remedial
perspective of aggregate litigation.
In the area of unfair commercial practices a wide array of
remedies is now available.146 While the implementation of the Unfair
commercial practice directive (UCPD) reveals a clear preference for
administrative over judicial enforcement, with the use of criminal law
by some MS, the use of judicial injunctions is still possible. Similar
paths seem to be followed in the US.147
... An unfair commercial practice may be stopped by injunction without giving rise to
compensatory damages unless negligence is proved. This might be the case if intention is required
for restitution or skimming off, while it is not for injunctive relief.
145 See, e.g., Bakardjeva, supra note 61, at 73 (in Bulgaria where the new CPA of 2o06 has
granted the rights of consumer associations to lodge complaints seeking injunctive relief, damages
on behalf of a group of consumers and damages based on collective consumer interests.)
146 See Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 76.
117 See The Federal Trade Commission Act I5 U.S.C. 45 and at State level for instance the
Michigan Consumer Protection Act (M.C.L.A.) at 445.910, where the attorney general may bring a
class action on behalf of persons residing in or injured in this state for the actual damages caused
by any of the following:
(a) A method, act, or practice in trade or commerce defined as unlawful under section
3(b) A method, act, or practice in trade or commerce declared to be unlawful under
section 3(0) by a final judgment of the circuit court or an appellate court of this state
which is either reported officially or made available for public dissemination pursuant
to section o by the attorney general not less than 3o days before the method, act, or
practice on which the action is based occurs.
(c) A method, act, or practice in trade or commerce declared by a circuit court of
appeals or the supreme court of the United States to be an unfair or deceptive act or
practice within the meaning of section 5(a)(i) of the federal trade commission act, i5
U.S.C. 45(a)(i), in a decision which affirms or directs the affirmance of a cease and
desist order issued by the federal trade commission if the order is final within the
meaning of section 5(g) of the federal trade commission act, 15 U.S.C. 45(g), and which
is officially reported not less than 3o days before the method, act, or practice on which
the action is based occurs. For purposes of this subdivision, a method, act, or practice
shall not be deemed to be unfair or deceptive within the meaning of section 5(a)(i) of
the federal trade commission act solely because the method, act, or practice is made
unlawful by another federal statute that refers to or incorporates section 5(a)(I) of the
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Within administrative enforcement the option has been for ex
post control. No preventive authorization for trade practices, including
advertisements, is required but for few exceptions mainly related to
health and safety. It is not infrequent, however, that individual
enterprises or trade. associations might informally negotiate general
rules with the Agency. For example, industry-wide codes of conduct
concerning trade practices are often used, their content being
negotiated ex ante with the competent regulators, be it the general or
the sector specific regulator.
A third mode of enforcement is provided by self-regulatory
bodies. They have a very deep rooted tradition in the field of
advertisement and have broadened into the general field of unfair
commercial practices. Remedies differ from those deployed in
administrative and judicial enforcement and reputational and
organizational sanctions are in place. Self-regulatory bodies operate
within systems of complementarities with administrative and judicial
enforcement. Unlike the two other systems subject to the scrutiny of
European law concerning equivalence and effectiveness, self-regulatory
regimes at national level do not have to comply with enforcement
principles at EU level.14

What is the relationship between public enforcement, including
administrative and judicial, and enforcement in self-regulatory
regimes? It is important to notice that in some legislation sequential
enforcement has been introduced. Parties can agree to bring the claim
firstly before the self-regulatory body; only afterwards, before the
administrative or judicial enforcer. If simultaneous enforcement takes
place the administrative enforcer can, upon its discretion, suspend the
proceeding and wait for the final decision of the private enforcer.49
Not only prohibitory but also affirmative injunctions are
allowed.15 ° The former are used to stop an unfair practice, the latter
impose modifications to eliminate the unfairness from the practice. In
practice, the most prominent example is corrective advertisement,
federal trade commission act.
(2) On motion of the attorney general and without bond in an action under this section
the court may make an appropriate order: to reimburse persons who have suffered
damages; to carry out a transaction in accordance with the aggrieved persons'
reasonable expectations; to strike or limit the application of unconscionable clauses of
contracts to avoid an unconscionable result; or to grant other appropriate relief. The
court after a hearing may appoint a receiver or order sequestration of the defendant's
assets if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant threatens or is
about to remove, conceal, or dispose of his assets to the detriment of members of the
class.
"' See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcement in European Private Regulation: Assessing
Effectiveness and Efficacy, unpublished manuscript on file with the author.
149
See, e.g., the Italian Consumer Code art. 27.3.
's See, e.g., Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 76, at art. i i. The Authority
in Italy held the .misleading character of an advertisement campaign concerning slimming pills,
thereby ordering its suspension. AGCM, Provvedimento n. 1651S, P15 4 85-EPH 200 Capsule. In
the Italian case law see Trib. Palermo, 20.02.2008; Trib. Torino, 17.05.2002 and 1.07.2002, in Giur.
It., 2002, 2334; Trib. Roma, sez. IX, 23.05.2008, in Giur. It., 2008, 12.
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where the injunction obliges the advertiser to modify the defective
advertisement. The role of both judges and administrative authorities is
regulatory in nature when they administer these types of injunctions.
By issuing affirmative injunctions the enforcers contribute to the
definition of unfair practices and police'markets accordingly.
In addition to prohibitory and affirmative injunctions,
penalties, in the form of astreintes, have been introduced in cases of
non-compliance.

151

The injunction to stop misleading or aggressive practices is
more and more associated to claims for damages, whether they be
purely compensatory or aimed at disgorging unlawful profits. 1 2 In
order to seek pecuniary remedies it is not necessary to plead an
injunction successfully, i.e. an injunction is not a prerequisite to ask for
damages. It might happen however that a claimant, a consumer
association, first seeks to stop the unfair trade practices, thereby
seeking injunctive relief; and then individual consumers try recovering
damages, thus giving rise to sequential enforcement." 3 The DCFR
(Draft Common Frame of Reference) has introduced two types of
damages that can be associated to injunction in the context of unfair
commercial practices: loss upon reliance on incorrect advice or
information, and loss upon fraudulent misrepresentation." 4 In the
's'
See Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, supra note 76, at art. 13. These penalties can
either be administered by administrative authorities or by Courts, depending on the choice made
by MS while implementing the Directive. These rules clearly open the space for introducing
punitive damages. The broad formula adopted in art. i3 does not limit the use of penalty only to
failure to comply with injunctions or other orders because it refers generically to infringements of
national provisions adopted in application of the directive.
' See for example the Belgian legislation implementing the Directive. Art. 94/14:
§ ier. Les contrats et les conditions de fourniture de produits et de services aux
consommateurs peuvent tre interpr&6ts notamment en fonction des messages
publicitaires et des pratiques commerciales en relation directe avec ceux-ci.
§ 2. Lorsqu'un contrat a 6t6 conclu hLla suite d'une pratique commerciale d6loyale [...]
le consommateur peut, dans un d6lai raisonnable A partir du moment o6 il a eu
connaissance ou aurait dO avoir connaissance de son existence, exiger le
remboursement des sommes payes, sans restitution du produit livr6 ou du service
fourni.
Lorsqu'un contrat a 6t6 conclu Ala suite d'une pratique commerciale d6loyale [...] le
juge peut, sans pr6judice des sanctions de droit commun, ordonner le remboursement
au consommateur des sommes qu'il a pay~es sans restitution par celui-ci du produit
livr6 ou du service fourni.
See also the Irish Consumer Protection Act, 2007 (Act No. 19/2007) (Ir.), at art. 74. 2 ("A consumer
who is aggrieved by a prohibited act or practice shall have a right of action for relief by way of
damages, including exemplary damages.").
15. Whilst the German law on unfair commercial practices, does not separate the procedure
for injunction and the skimming-off procedure, the German consumer organisations tend to first
request an action. The reason is twofold. Under German law, the claimant is asked to settle the
conflict before filing an action in the court. If the claimant does not try he bears the risk to pay the
costs in case the defendant submits himself to the request. The second has to do with the different
requirements on proof. In Italian jurisprudence, the previous approach denied any standing for the
association of consumers in claims for damages in favour of consumers. See Trib. Torino,

20.11.2oo6, in Foro It., 2007, 1, 1298; Trib. Genova, 2.o8.2005, in Danno e Resp., 2005, 1225; Trib.
Milano, 15.09.2004, in Giur. It., 2005, 998, with a comment by De Santis.
114 See
VI.-2.2o7 and VI.- 2.210 PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) OUTLINE EDITION,
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current European regime sequential enforcement is problematic
because individual consumers asking for damages for contracts
concluded on the basis of misleading advertisements cannot rely on the
findings of the proceeding concerning injunctive relief unless they have
joined it. The binding effects of injunctions are limited to the litigants
and only joinders allow economies on evidence-gathering. This is true
also for injunctions issued by Agencies when the implementation of art.
i I UCPD is made through administrative enforcement.
Substantive rules vary for the two classes of remedies. The
elements to be proven for an injunction may differ from those necessary
to recover damages. 5 A strict liability regime operates for the former,
while proof of fault is often required for the latter. No harm is
necessary for the former, proof of harm is often a prerequisite for the
latter. The burden of proof differs in the proceeding concerning an
injunction before the Agency and that related to damages before the
Court.156 Causation is stricter for action seeking damages.15 7
Some MS, while implementing the Directive 2005/29, have
added new forms of enforcement, focusing on cooperation between
enforcers and infringers.15 1 Cooperative enforcement has been
promoted in the UK as a general enforcement strategy.5 9 Well known
in the fields of competition and environmental law it has been
transposed in different forms in the area of consumer protection. Italy
and Ireland, for example, have given the competent Administrative
Authority the power to 'define' with the trader the undertakings to
modify the unfair practice so as to eliminate the elements of
unfairness. 160 In this context the trader can commit to cease the unfair
practices while also compensating injured parties for any harm
suffered. 6 '
Cooperative enforcement can take a number of different forms.
(Sellier, 2009).
155

See Irish Consumer Protection Act, supra note 152, at art. 71.6 ("If the Court considers it

necessary or appropriate in the circumstances taking into account all interests involved and, in
particular, the public interest, the court may make an order under this section without proof of any
actual loss or damage or of any intention or negligence on the part of the trader."). See Italian
Cass., Sez. Un., 15.01.2OO9, n. 794 (holding that under the law against misleading advertisement
the plaintiff asking for damages has to prove the misleading character of the message, the damage
and its causal relation to the misleading advertisement, that the defendant is in fault). See
,
generally Cass., 28.03.o6, n. 7036,Cass., 6.042006, n. 7985, Cass., Sez. 30 13.02.2007, n. 3086,
Cass., 4.07.2007, 15131, Cass., 29.08.2008, n. 21934.
156 See, e.g., in Italy Cass., Sez. Un., 15.01.2009, n. 794 (stating that unlike in the proceeding
concerning injunctions before the Competition Agency where it is for the trader to prove the
absence of unfairness in those concerning damages it is for the consumer to prove that the practice
was unfair and caused damages.).
"' See Jane Stapleton, Regulating Torts, in REGULATING LAW (Christine Parker, Colin
Scott, Nicola Lacey, & John Braithwaite, eds., Oxford, 2004).
"' See Comparative Assessment, supra note ii. See the Irish Consumer protection Act,
supra note 156, at art. 74.2.

"l9 See generally supra note 53.
'60 See, e.g., art. 27 Italian Consumer Code as it has been modified by legislative decree,
Aug. 2, 2007, n. 146.
61 See, e.g., Irish Consumer Protection Act, supra note 152, at art. 73.4.
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It can be framed within self-enforcing agreements which in case of
violation by the trader can be directly sanctioned by the administrative
authority. It may take the form of a regulatory contract enforceable
only before a Court. Within the framework of cooperative enforcements
a coordination between injunctive
relief and damages can take place
61 2
under the control of theAgency.
Coordination will be needed to implement an integrated
strategy able to pursue deterrence and compensation appropriately by
pleading injunctive relief and damages. However, the developments of
administrative enforcement in some MS, the UK for example, suggest
some further qualifications. The use of co-regulation in the area of
unfair commercial practices is more frequent than other areas of
consumer law; and this is reflected in the forms of enforcement
administered by private organizations, formally or informally delegated
by the public authority.'6 3 This regulatory form often brings new forms
of enforcement
concurring
with judicial
and
conventional
administrative enforcement.
ii. i. Unfair Contract Terms
Control over unfair terms in MS precedes European legislation.
In legislation enacted in Germany (1976), England (1977), and France
(1978) different models of control were adopted, reflecting varieties of
capitalisms and different combination between judicial and
administrative control. 164 European intervention has mainly addressed
the definition of unfairness, introduced new remedies while leaving
open relevant choices concerning modes of enforcement.'6 5 Unlike
UCPD where the combination was injunction and damages, here it is
injunction and invalidity or lack of binding effects.
In the area of unfair contract terms (UCT) according to EC
Directive 93/13 enforcement could have been either judicial or
administrative. Most MS have chosen ex post judicial enforcement.
However, the role of monitoring by administrative Agencies is very
relevant, though often informal, unlike the case of UCPD. The directive
allows prohibitory and affirmative injunctions in addition to declatory
judgements. 166 Different national models are in place, some mainly
162
163

On cooperative enforcement see ComparativeAssessment, supra note ii.
In the area of deceptive advertisement the Advertising Standards Authority in the UK

can deploy different remedies. See the agreement between OFT and ASA concerning handling
complaints. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, PrivateRegulation and European Private Law, in TOWARDS A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (4 th ed., 2010) (forthcoming).
"
For an illustration see Hans W. Micklitz, Some Reflections on Cassis De Dijon and the
Conirol of Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts, in HUGH COLLINS, STANDARD
CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE: A BASIS FOR AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
19, 24 (Kluwer, 2oo8).

"' See Contract I, PRINCIPLES OF EXISTING EC CONTRACT LAW (Acquis Principles),
(European law Publishers, 2009)
166 See Dir. 93/13, supra note 73, at art. 7.
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agencies,
others on
consumer
upon
administrative
relying
organisations. In the UK, for example, the role of OFT is
predominant. 167 It has been given both the power to monitor and that of
promoting judicial control. The latter has been used very
parsimoniously.16 In France, la Commission des clauses abusives has
significant monitoring power but no standing. 169 It is for consumer
organizations to use the information collected in the reports by the
Commission. 7 ' In Germany monitoring is often made by associations
which also have the power to bring claims before Courts. In Italy, as
well, monitoring is mainly performed by consumer organizations. The
enforcement system is thus a combination of public-private monitoring
and judicial control.
The differences among these systems are reflected in various
combinations between market and social control, which may affect
choice of remedies, negotiating strategies between parties and with
administrative enforcers, and preferences over settlements.
Unlike unfair commercial practices no forms of cooperative
enforcement have specifically been designed by European or national
legislation in the field of unfair contract terms. However, undertakings
by enterprises could be sought by enforcers. This has certainly been the
case in relation to competition law, where public enforcers have asked
trade associations to make explicit commitments about practices
167 See Geraint Howells, Enforcing Consumer Interests by Regulatory Agencies-The British
Experience a Case Study of the Office of Fair Trading, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT F
CONSUMER LAW, supra note i I,at 65.
168 See Director General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank plc, [2ool] UKHL 52,

[2oo2] 1 AC 481. In the First National Bank case the courts were concerned with a term in a
common form loan agreement which provided for the continuance of contractual interest
payments after judgment had been given in favor of the bank in the county court, where, unlike
the position on a High Court judgment, statute does not provide for interest to be payable on a
money judgment. The Director General of Fair Trading considered the term to be unfair for the
purpose of regulation 4 of the 1994 Regulations and sought an injunction to restrain use of the
term by the bank. The bank argued that an assessment of the fairness of the term was prohibited
by art. 3(2) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994. According to Lord
Bingham:
The object of the regulations and the directive is to protect consumers against the
inclusion of unfair and prejudicial terms in standard-form contracts into which they
enter, and that object would plainly be frustrated if regulation 3 (2)(b) were so broadly
interpreted as to cover any terms other than those falling squarely within it. In my
opinion the term, as part of a provision prescribing the consequences of default, plainly
does not fall within it. It does not concern the adequacy of the interest earned by the
bank as its remuneration but is designed to ensure that the bank's entitlement to
interest does not come to an end on the entry of judgment. First National Bank, [2oo]
UKHL 52, at para. 12.
See also Office of Fair Trading vs Abbey National PLC, et al., [2009] EWCA Civ 1i6 (Court
upheld a judgment concerning whether or not the OFT is entitled to assess the fairness of certain
charges made by the Banks under art. 6(2)(b) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1999. The action was about the charges made by the Banks to their customers who
have personal current accounts with them when they are requested or instructed to make a
payment for which they do not hold the necessary funds in the account and which is not covered
by a facility arranged with the customer.
169
See Jean Calais Aulois & Frank Steinmetz, Droit de laconsommation, Precis Dalloz, 640
(Mar. 2003).
170

Id.
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concerning bank charges and other elements like termination clauses in
standard contract forms. 1 '
The unfair term is not binding on the consumer but the contract
shall continue to be binding upon the remaining terms. MS had to
introduce injunctive relief in the implementation of the directive."'
Injunctions can be pleaded by consumer organizations against single
enterprises, groups of enterprise or trade associations that recommend
standard contract terms.'73 When injunctions are pleaded against trade
associations recommending terms current procedural rules exclude
binding effects on individual enterprises, members of the
recommending association, unless they are joined in the proceeding.
Thus, in theory, even if an injunction against a term recommended by
the trade association has been issued, the individual enterprise could
insert it in the contract. Only a new proceeding will scrutinize the
unfairness of the term and eventually oblige the enterprise to set it
aside. Symmetrically the effects of the injunction pleaded by the
consumer association will not bind the enterprises in the individual
relationship with the consumers. When operating within a sequential
enforcement scheme, individual consumers seeking damages will only
be able to use the findings in the proceeding for injunction if they had
joined but the enterprise can prove that in the specific circumstances
the terms were fair. Otherwise the injunctions will not have effect on
subsequent litigation between the enjoined enterprise and individual
74
consumers.

The insertion of the directive 93/13 in the Annex of directive
also makes those injunctions applicable to the subject matter. 7 5
Injunctions can impose exclusion of unfair terms from the standard
contract forms. They generally operate for future relationships while
are held to be non-binding for contracts already concluded to have
unfair terms. 176 In some MS injunctions produce effects not only on
98/27

17 See the commitments made by the ABI (Associazione bancaria italiana) and the
consortium of banks known as Patti Chiari under art. 14-ter L. n. 287/90, in the context of an
antitrust procedure opened by the AGCM (n. i88661o8). The final decision is expected by
September 2009.
172 See Commission v. Italy, 2002, Case C-1 19/04.
171 See Directive 93/13, supra note 77, at art. 7.3.
174
See in England Oft v. Foxtons Limited Court of Appeal [2009] EWCA Civ. 288, and
Feetum v. Levy [20o6] 3 WLR 427 (CA), FSA v. Rourke [2002]
"'
See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 69.
176 See in England OFT v. Foxtons Limited Court of Appeal [2oo9] EWCA Civ. 288 par
71:

There is no question of the findings in a collective challenge being binding on a
subsequent individual challenge in proceedings between the supplier and an individual
consumer :the parties to those proceedings are different.The issue decided as between
the parties to a collective challenge can thus be revisited in in individual challenge. But
if there is an injunction which extends to existing contracts, the ability of the supplier
to initiate or participate in such proceedings will be governed by the terms of that
injunctions. Indeed, it is the fact that the findings on a collective challenge are not
binding in an individual dispute which makes it necessary in order to protect
consumers in a meaningful way for the court to be able to grant an injunction in the
case of an existing contract.
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future but also on existing contracts. 7 A judge can order, by means of
In some MS
injunction, the deletion of an unfair contract term.'
judicial discretion allows 'carving out' contracts.'79 But the boundaries
between effects of injunctions and that of invalidity of the individual
contract are not always clear cut. These invalidity rules might be
coupled with damages for precontractual liability.' When injunctions
are sought by consumer organizations, individual consumers may join
to seeking compensatory remedies.
There are two sets of pecuniary remedies that may interplay
with injunctive relief in the area of unfair contract terms: compensatory
and restitutionary. Compensatory damages can be sought if the use of
an unfair term can give rise to precontractual or extracontractual
liability following the use of unfair terms. It should be clear at the
outset that a successful plea for injunctive relief is not necessarily
combined with precontractual liability and the invalidity of the unfair
term. l"'
But there are hypotheses in which the prohibition of the use of
an unfair term can be associated to damages. In that case the contract
can still be valid and precontractual liability refers to the specific unfair
term. 182
In the area of unfair contract terms damages are often
restitutionary. Restitution, in this case, is often the consequence of
avoidance of the unfair term. Claims for restitution can successfully be
pleaded if the term of the contract is not binding. This is often a matter
for an individual claimant while a consumer organization usually
cannot have a term be declared not binding through collective
proceedings. In some MS, however, restitution can be ordered with an
injunction giving rise to hybrid collective action. 1" 3
The limits of the regulation are also related to the difficulty of
policing Europe wide practices. National Courts in MS do not have the
power to enjoin a contract term used Europe-wide but have only State
jurisdiction.

1"
See on the relation to the deterrence function of injunctions provided by Dir. 93/13 in
Italy Cass. 13051, 21.05.2oo8 (holding that limiting the scope of injunction to future relationships
would contradict the rationale of that remedy).
"78 See, e.g., art. L. 421-6 French Code de la Consommation ("The judge may order.., the
deletion of an illegal or abusive clause from any contract or standard contract offered to or
intended for the consumer.').
171 See in England OFT v. Foxtons Limited Court of Appeal [2oo9] EWCA Civ. 288 where
Lady Justice Arlen stated that "Regulation 12(3) gives the Court a very wide discretion as to the
form of any injunction. In an appropriate case, the court could, for example, 'carve out' contracts
fulfilling a particular description."
1 See Directive 93113, supra note 73.
1 See Tribunale di Roma, 30.04.2oo8, at n. 58 (holding that in the context of a collective
action restitution can be successfully pleaded in order to eliminate the effects of unfair commercial
practices and contract terms).
112 In Italy see Cass. 29.09.2005, n. 19024; and Cass. 8.1o.2oo8, n. 24795.
113 See in Italy Tribunale di Roma 23.05.o8.
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2.

Product Safety

In the area of product safety and liability the injunction
directive 98/27 does not apply. Injunctive type remedies, however, are
available, such as product recall and product withdrawal both under
Directive 2001/95; but also as judicially administered remedies
according to many legal systems." 4
The most common case is the combination between voluntary
or administrative recall and damages. However, if voluntary recall has
not taken place consumers may ask for it before the Court. Claimants
may thus ask for damages caused by the defective product and seek
product recall or withdrawal before the Court.'85 A complementary
path is that of directive 2001/95 on product safety where recall or
withdrawal can be ordered by the competent administrative authority
and damages be sought before a Court.
The foregoing examples show that judicial enforcement, being
exercised upon the lead of private and/or public claimants, is often the
result of a combination of injunctive relief and pecuniary remedies. In
different terms this happens also when injunctive remedies are defined
by administrative authorities and pecuniary remedies by Courts. In
both cases different combinations between ex ante and ex post can
occur. Especially in relation to collective judicial enforcement the two
can be combined: the choice between injunction and damages is not
constrained by lack of legislation and it becomes primarily a matter of
choice by the claimants. However, in this area as well findings
concerning the infringement related to injunctive relief cannot be used
by individual claimants seeking damages. Thus, but for few exceptions,
if a product is held defective and recalled from the market these
findings could not be used in individual litigation concerning damages
in the same MS state and a fortiori in a different one.'86
184

It should be noted that the Product liability directive is limited to damages and does not

regulate injunctive relief as it is the case for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402(a). In

Europe, there are two famous examples from the area of product safety, that concern the public
warning against health risks: OLG Stuttgard NJW 1990, 2690 - Birkel, and ECJ, 17 April 2007,
Case C- 4 70/0 3 , COS.MET, [2007] ECR 1-27 4 9.
"Bs It presupposes that individuals are entitled to seek product recall or withdrawal. This,
however, is the case only in a few Member States., see e.g. Italy and Portugal, Art. 1 (2) of Law
83/95; see generally Global Class Actions Exchange, www.globalclassactions.stanford.edu.
1"'
Difficulties also exist in the U.S. See, e.g., the objections posed by Judge Posner in In Re
matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Incorporated at al, 51 F. 3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). Considering
the innovative yet, in his evaluation impermissible solution proposed by the District Court, Judge
Posner stated:
The district court proposes to substitute a single trial before a single jury instructed in
accordance with no actual law of any jurisdiction - a jury that will receive a kind of
esperanto instruction merging the negligence standards of the 50 States and the district
of Columbia.... That kind of thing can in our system of civil justice ( it is not likely to
happen because the industry is likely to settle - whether or not it really is liable):
without violating anyone's legal right. But it need not be tolerated when the alternative
exists of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting in the aggregate a much
larger and more diverse sample of decision makers. That would not be a feasible option
if the stakes to each class members were too slight to repay the costs of a consolidated
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PART IV - CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISMS IN CONSUMER ENFORCEMENT
12.

Conflicts of Interests Among Consumers and Between Consumers
and Traders Concerning the Choice Of Remedies: Refining the
Remedial Perspective

Simple coordination among different remedies and enforcers
can certainly improve enforcement policies in European consumer law,
contributing to prioritize between regulatory functions, deterrence and
compensation. It is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition. Even if a
better coordinated strategy were in place, defining simultaneous and
sequential enforcement rules concerning follow-on, additional questions
would remain. In particular, conflicts of interests between different
classes of consumers related to the combination between injunctions
and damages and even within damages for different sub-classes, have
to be addressed. Two potentially conflicting goals emerge: the desire to
reach a final conclusion of litigation excluding so called collateral
attacks and the necessity to protect actual claimants and future
potential claimants from inadequate remedies precluding them from
accessing courts. Stability is certainly an important goal of aggregate
litigation but it has to be balanced with individual and collective due
process rights. Different solutions may be necessary for different classes
of claimants over time and this might reduce the stability of the final
outcome and the defendants' incentives to settle with waivers
concerning future litigation.1 7 Conflicts of interest, especially among
classes of claimants, may emerge under different doctrines such as:
commonality, typicality, predominance.' 88 Not only do they constitute a
limit to aggregation but they also act as a constraint on coordination
among different types of remedies and modes of enforcement. As we
shall see when various classes of claimants have different preferences
about remedies, separation between modes of enforcement may be
preferable over integration both within judicial enforcement-by
distinguishing proceedings concerning injunctions and damages-and
between administrative and judicial enforcement.
The differences concerning hybrids between the U.S. and
Europe are relevant." 9 In the U.S. Rule 23(b)(2) does not allow opt-out,

proceeding. But this is not the case with regard to the HIV-hemophilia litigation.
Posner himself recognizes that this solution has been accepted by federal courts in asbestos
litigation but criticises its outcome. In Amchem the Supreme Court on the one hand recognized the
legitimacy of aggregation decided by the MDL Panel and on the other hand rejected the solution
proposed by the district Court of Pennsylvania. Amchem, 521 U.S. 591.

Ws' See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U.

PA. L. REV. 1650 (2008).
'8
See NAGAREDA, supra note 128, at 94.
189 See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 2; and American Exceptionalism, supra note 2.
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while Rule 23(b)(3) permits opt-out and imposes notice requirements. In
Europe injunctions often do not have general effects beyond the parties
involved in litigation. Different results may arise in individual MS
litigation and the emerging MS legislation on group actions is
predominantly opt-in based.' While at first sight Europe seems to be
more respectful of individual due process rights and preclusion effects,
the real lack of effectiveness of collective litigation and remedies reveals
still lower levels of consumer enforcement making that protection much
less relevant. The alternative opt-in/opt-out, though certainly relevant,
does not constitute the most significant variable to address and to solve
conflicts of interests. These differ in relation to type of remedies and
require accountability mechanisms that ensure protection of absentees
but also adequate representation of those who have chosen to actively
participate in the litigation process with conflicting interests.
Certification procedures and settlements' review are certainly
important; but exit, voice and loyalty need to complement them. 9 '
Consumers, affected by a violations across Europe, may have
different preferences as to which litigation strategy should be pursued.
But perhaps as importantly their representatives may have divergent
interests and prefer different remedies, thereby selecting different
modes of enforcement. Different procedural strategies may be required
by substantive legal requirements. The same violation, contaminated
blood with the HIV virus or exposure to asbestos, can be based on
different theories of liability depending on when the injury has
occurred and what the available knowledge was at the time it
materialized. These different theories may prevent the use of aggregate
litigation for lack of commonality or require sub-classing; potentially
generating conflicts among classes of injured consumers.92
Different remedies can be associated to different injurers'
liability theories and plaintiffs' conduct to avoid or to mitigate harm.
Plaintiffs conduct is generally not considered when deciding about
injunctions whilst they become relevant to define the existence of
liability in the context of damages. Causation has different features
when injunctions or damages are sought. These differences are here
considered as potential determinants of conflicts of interest unlike
before, when they were examined to design appropriate forms of
coordination within aggregate litigation and between aggregate and

190

See Deborah R. Hensler. The GlobalizationOf Class Actions: An Overview, 622 ANNALS

OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 7 (2009).
'
See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999

SuP. CT. REV. 385 (1999); Coffee, supra note 1o2; Geoffrey Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class
Action Litigation:An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CH. LEGAL F. 581 (2003);
Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 167 (2009).
192 For a comparative analysis in Europe, focusing on UK and France, see SIMON
WHITTAKER,
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individual litigation."3
.Conflicts of interest and accountability questions may be
addressed in relation to several issues:
a) The desirabilityof aggregatingclaims: Different interests may
translate into lack of commonality and cause the exclusion of
aggregation depending on the remedy sought;
b) The composition of the group or class: Conflicts of interest
may affect the criteria deployed to create the class or to proceed to subclassing. Claims are aggregated into sub-classes according to different
types of remedies but also different modes of enforcement and even
different national legal systems; 94
c) The multiplicity of enforcement strategies within the group:
Within the same class or group preferences over remedies may be
different and an agreement can be reached among different members of
the class/group to pursue different litigation strategies.
A few potential conflicts can be exemplified:
i) The producers' decision concerning safety features produces
a risk of harm. Some consumers know they will be exposed to the risk
others do not know which risks they will be exposed to.
2) The violation has occurred but when litigation starts harm
has materialized only for one class of consumers. The others know that
the harm will materialize but do not know when and which type will
occur and how it will affect individual members of the class.
3) Consumers may have different preferences over the level of
safety of a product or a certain commercial practice that may be
considered unfair. Those who are more risk averse may prefer the
product to be removed from the market, the others may prefer the
product staying and giving consumers the option whether to buy or not,
once they have accurately been informed.
In case 2 the different interests imply that those who have
already suffered harm, if they are not repeat players, may not be
interested in injunctions but only seeking damages. The others, on the
contrary, may not be interested in damages either because they cannot
recover at all or can only recover a small amount (e.g. fluid recovery
cases). In this framework there are several possibilities depending on
whether litigation about the same violation needs to combine the
remedies within the same proceeding or different classes can seek
different remedies in different proceedings and only coordination is
needed.

'9'
See Amchem, 521 U.s. 591, 625-26 (Requirement for certification of class action under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) that named parties will fairly and adequately protect interest of class was
not met where parties sought to achieve global settlement of current and future asbestos related to
the claims).

114 In the U.S, subclassing may follow state jurisdiction when the differences among states

are compatible with commonality requirement but too high to create a single class. In Europe the
issue of commonality when claimants coming from different jurisdictions bring a single aggregate
claim has not been addressed.
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These divergent interests pose regulatory issues concerning the
agency relationship between consumers and their representatives,
which affect the choice of modes of enforcement and that of remedies.
But this is not the only open question. Since consumer enforcement,
both at European and MS level, provides standing to different bodies,
i.e. consumer associations, public bodies and private law firms, is it
possible, or even desirable, that different strategies will develop across
Europe for the same infringement? Today competing legal actions
across Europe may be based on different remedial strategies and
brought by uncoordinated if not competing actors. Can competition
among claims and claimants increase the conflicts of interest and
eventually decrease the level of consumer protection or at least increase
distributional conflicts among different classes of consumers located in
different MS? Does competition decrease coordination or affect the
modes of coordination? Should aggregation always be voluntary or
should there be cases of mandatory aggregation despite conflicts of
interests?
Furthermore, these conflicts of interest may arise not only
among different classes of consumers but also between consumers and
traders when standing is granted to both as it is the case in Europe for
unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practices, and in antitrust
private enforcement. It should be recalled that recent MS legislations
on group and representative actions have ignored these issues leaving
the task of regulating the agency relationship to the conventional law of
lawyering and the law of associations.195
An important distinction must be made at the outset between
prohibitory and affirmative injunctions. I first examine the choice
between prohibitory and affirmative injunctions and then the
relationship between injunctive relieves and damages.
12. .i.

The Choice Between Prohibitoryand Affirmative Injunctions

EC Directive 98/27 and EC Regulation 2oo6/2004 mainly relate
to prohibitory but may also include affirmative injunctions. Consumers
may diverge on the type of injunctions they seek: whether prohibitory
or affirmative. Those who prefer prohibitory injunctions will
presumably value the risks associated to the unfair practice or the
defective product higher than the benefits even if the unfairness or the
defect can, to a certain extent, be cured. The opposite is true for those
favoring affirmative injunctions, presumably seeking to cure the
problem and still being able to use the product or to deploy the clause
in the contract.
12.1.2.

ProhibitoryInjunctions and Damages

195
See on these questions Fabrizio Cafaggi, Conflict of Interests and Loyalty in Aggregate
Litigation, unpublished manuscript on file with the author.
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Prohibitory injunctions have effects that reach beyond those
who seek the remedies. If a product is placed out of the market or a
practice declared unfair and prohibited then little can be done for the
class of consumers interested in keeping the product in the market or
the commercial practice in place.
12.1.3.

Affirmative Injunctions and Damages

Affirmative injunctions can be more selective and reach a
qualified number of consumers. The use of affirmative injunctions
implies that the problem can be fixed. In the case of an unsafe product,
safety can be improved by curing the defect; in the case of unfair
contract terms or practices the term or practice can be corrected by
changing some of its features. But most importantly it may imply that
the specific risk or source of unfairness, perhaps associated with a
specific class of consumer, can be cured without depriving the other
consumers of the benefits stemming from the clause, the practice, or the
product.
In the context of individual remedies the problem is solved by
giving the buyer or the consumer the choice between curing or
terminating the contract and damages. In aggregate litigation to
provide choices is harder. When remedies are incompatible and subclassing is not the solution, choices have to be made according to the
principle of proportionality, which applies to enforcement.
The principle of proportionality suggests that affirmative
injunctions should be preferred over prohibitory injunctions. Similarly
affirmative injunctions should be preferred over damages.
Let us contrast an affirmative injunction to curing the product
defect or to modifying the unfair term or contractual clause and
damages. This injunction is incompatible with damages, at least with
economic losses. As the examples concerning individual remedies
demonstrate if claimants choose the right to cure they cannot ask for
damages until cure has shown to be ineffective.' 96 Affirmative
injunctions can be seen as a collective right to cure and should be held
incompatible with damages.
Thus, when affirmative injunctions for cure are sought they
would exclude damages. If different classes of consumers have
196 See in the European context DCFR 1i.- 3.202 Cure by debtor: general rules:
(i) The debtor may make a new and conforming tender if that can be done within the
time allowed for performance;
(2) If the debtor can not make a new and conforming tender within the time allowed
for performance but promptly after being notified of the lack of conformity offers to
cure within a reasonable time and at the debtor's own expense, the creditor may not
pursue any remedy for non-performance, other than withholding performance, before
allowing the debtor a reasonable period in which to attempt to cure the nonconformity.
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conflicting preferences over the two remedies the judge will have to
decide which remedies should be granted. Principles concerning these
choices by class representatives should be designed in order to reduce
conflicts of interest.
CONCLUSION
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO REMEDIES CONCERNING AGGREGATE
LITIGATION IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
In this essay I have suggested that European consumer policies
need to tackle fundamental issues concerning coordination among
modes of enforcement and among sectors from a remedial perspective.
Higher coordination in administering different remedies increases
policy consistency, allows economizing in information costs, avoids
multiplication of litigation over the same issues, thereby ensuring
stability and uniformity. Coordination does not require integration in a
single enforcement strategy. On the contrary conflicting interests may
call for a combination of different yet coordinated enforcement
strategies.
The scope of enforcement coordination is quite broad and
encompasses different functions ranging from deterrence, to
compensation, and risk management. The focus on the alternative
between public and private enforcement does not capture the real
issues related to the nature and function of remedies and the actors that
can adequately represent consumers in litigation and negotiations for
settlements. A remedial perspective highlights the real alternatives and
provides a clearer framework to address and to solve conflicts of
interests among different classes of claimants and between them and
their representatives.
A meaningful comparative institutional analysis following the
European Green Paper on collective redress has to consider the
following: standing, or entry regulation, selection of representatives and
certification, content of the remedies, settlement, binding effects of the
judgment or the settlement, preclusion. Coordination between
administrative and judicial enforcement should be explicitly addressed
and solved; in particular when both injunctions and damages are
simultaneously sought. When appropriate to economize in litigation
costs, sequential enforcement should be preferred over simultaneous
enforcement. This will reduce information costs, making available
evidence gathered under the first type of enforcement to be used in
follow-on suits. So, for example, if administrative enforcement comes
first, findings concerning the existence of infringement and liability
could be used, where substantive law permits, in the proceedings
concerning damages which will follow. Coordination between
I
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administrative and judicial enforcement is necessary but not sufficient.
Conflicts of interests between different classes of consumers may arise
and require different strategies of integration or separation between
proceedings. The existence of conflicts of interest should influence the
institutional design of coordination in aggregate litigation. When
conflicts cannot be solved separation of litigation and sub-classing are
needed to ensure that due process rights can be fully exercised.
I have made four normative claims related to potential legal
reforms to be introduced in Europe:
a) The use of consumer enforcement for regulatory purposes
requires important procedural changes.
b) An effective deterring strategy imposes higher integration of
remedial responses both between judicial and administrative
enforcement and within judicial enforcement between injunction and
damages. This coordination should take place between aggregate
litigation seeking different remedies, i.e. injunctions and damages but
also between administrative fines and damages, and between aggregate
and individual litigation.
c) Rules concerning conflicts of interests and representatives'
accountability in aggregate litigation are needed, differentiating lawyerclient relationships from organization-non-member claimants.
d) Enforcement of consumer law imposes the introduction of
new incentives on collective actors and a higher degree of competition
between law firms and consumer organizations, with the reduction of
rents enjoyed primarily by the latter.
In particular, drawing from the U.S. experience, some lessons
can be learned about the impact of conflicts of interest on aggregation.
A distinction between conflicts among active claimants and conflicts
between active and future claimants should be made. In opt-in system
the protection of absentees is less relevant than in opt-out systems.
The existence of conflicts of interest among classes of claimants
may: (a) limit the desirable level of aggregation, (b) suggest to prefer
sequential instead of simultaneous enforcement, (c) impose sub-classing
and different representatives for each sub-class. The homogeneous or
heterogeneous nature of claims should become a strategic factor.
Heterogeneity refines the category of commonality.
Heterogeneity of claims generally gives rise to the potential
conflict of interest and may require ad hoc solutions.
i) When claims are heterogeneous limited aggregation is
necessary and the distinction between injunctive relief and damages
may be appropriate.
2) When claims are heterogeneous it may be desirable to opt for
sequential enforcement with administrative or judicial injunctions
coming first and damages, on collective or individual basis, following.
3) When, claims are heterogeneous selecting different
representatives may increase accountability and decrease the risks of
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collusion with defendants.
Legal reforms on collective redress will provide Europe with a
unique opportunity to increase consumer confidence by developing
enforcement policies that can contribute to market integration and
consumer protection. They will offer Europe the chance to compete for
leadership in global litigation on consumer matters within a cooperative
framework with North and South America and Asian 'emerged'
markets. But Europe cannot act in a vacuum and should provide
national judiciaries with new instruments to manage aggregate
litigation in a fair and effective way.

